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iThis report is a summary of a joint CASE/DSS workshop that discussed indicators to
monitor the GovernmentÕs strategy to tackle poverty and social exclusion. Held on 
19 July 2000, the day was comprised of a series of talks from academics, people from
non-governmental organisations and officials, followed by discussion. The workshop
was organised to discuss, and promote expert debate on, the pros and cons of
different approaches to monitoring poverty and social exclusion. It was split into
three sessions covering measurement of income poverty and deprivation, wider
aspects of social exclusion and overall approaches to monitoring success, and
primarily focussed on child poverty. Around 50 people attended the workshop.
Most of the speakers have kindly produced papers of their talks. DSS and CASE do
not necessarily share the views they have expressed. The workshop predated the
second Opportunity for All report and therefore some of the papers may not reflect
developments within it — or work that is currently being developed on, for example,
the health inequalities indicator.
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1MEASUREMENT OF INCOME POVERTY AND DEPRIVATION: 
THE BRITISH APPROACH
John Hills, Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion
Background
The current political importance of measuring trends in poverty is exemplified by two
commitments by the Prime Minister:
ÒI believe in greater equality. If the next Labour Government has not raised
the living standards of the poorest by the end of its term in office, it will
have failed.Ó (July 1996)
ÒOur historic aim will be for ours to be the first generation to end child
poverty forever, and it will take a generation. It is a 20 year mission, but I
believe it can be done.Ó (March 1999)
While setting the political stakes high, these statements do not set a clear measure
for whether they have been achieved, and set different timescales. The first starts
with a statement about equality, which implies a focus on relative poverty. But the
second part of this statement is about raising real living standards and hence
reducing absolute poverty — a necessary but not sufficient condition (at times of
growth) for relative poverty to fall. The second contains the historic commitment to
ending Ôchild povertyÕ, but does not explain precisely what is meant by ÔpovertyÕ in
this context. 
However, the March 1999 speech also says that Òalmost one in three children in our
country lives in povertyÓ (Blair, 1999, p.16) which is consistent with the number of
children living in households with income below half average income (after housing
costs). Other Government statements have talked about the dramatic rise in child
poverty since the 1970s, which implies that this is a relative measure, referring to
contemporary average incomes.
Most concretely the 2000 Spending Review set a Public Service Agreement Òto reduce
by at least a quarter by 2004 the number of children living in households with an
income of less than 60 per cent of the medianÓ (HM Treasury, 2000, p.93). By
implication again, this refers to the contemporary median, and is thus a relative
target.
Session 1: Measurement of Income Poverty
and Deprivation
UK official poverty statistics
The UK does not have an official poverty line as in the US, or Minimum Income
Standard, as adopted by some other countries (Veit-Wilson, 1998). For a number of
years the (then) Department of Health and Social Security published a series for ÔLow
Income FamiliesÕ, with numbers given below, at, or near thresholds defined in relation
to what are now Income Support rates. This approach followed from Abel-Smith and
TownsendÕs (1965) analysis of post-war poverty trends. It was officially discontinued
in the mid-1980s on the grounds that a perverse effect of greater generosity in social
security benefit rates would lead to an increase in measured poverty, as the
thresholds rose in line with them.
Instead, the DSS now publishes the Households Below Average Income (HBAI) series.
This is based on survey data (now the Family Resources Survey) for the distribution
of equivalised net household income (i.e. adjusted for household size and after
benefits and direct taxes), measured both before and after allowing for housing costs.
This series generates both absolute and purely relative measures of the numbers with
low incomes. The main focus has been on the headcount of numbers with incomes
below 50 per cent of the contemporary mean, although recently more official
emphasis has been given than before to the numbers below 60 per cent of the
median. These two measures currently give much the same number, although the
latter would, for instance, have shown somewhat slower growth in the numbers with
low incomes over the 1980s. Recent editions of the statistics have also included some
information on the persistence or repetition of low income over time, drawing on the
British Household Panel Survey (e.g. DSS, 2000, ch.8).
Most recently the Government has committed itself to the production of an annual
ÔPoverty and Social Exclusion ReportÕ1 including a wide range of Ôindicators of successÕ
— more than thirty in the first (1999) report as well as those for a further four areas
to be monitored in relation to the Social Exclusion UnitÕs strategy for neighbourhood
renewal (DSS, 1999, summary pp 16-22).
These measures include numbers with relatively, absolutely and persistently low
incomes (measured against several different thresholds, e.g. 40 per cent, 50 per
cent, and 60 per cent of the mean) for three age groups (children, those of working
age, and older people). They also include numbers for: workless households; long-
term Income Support/means-tested Job SeekersÕ Allowance claimants; employment
rates of disadvantaged groups; and fuel poverty. More widely they include: education
outcomes in Sure Start areas and for care leavers; poor housing and rough sleeping;
health outcomes such as smoking, suicide, teenage pregnancy, and drug abuse; fear
of crime; and pension contributors.
Absolute or relative poverty lines?
A major issue in measuring income poverty is whether to focus on absolute or
relative measures. Absolute poverty lines become irrelevant eventually. Few people
would see the real poverty lines as drawn by, say Seebohm Rowntree one hundred
years ago as being relevant to contemporary notions of what would constitute
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poverty. If ability to participate in oneÕs own society is taken to be the focus, relative
lines are likely to be far more relevant: people with a fixed real income will find it
harder to participate as general prosperity rises around them. Evidence from the
Breadline Britain surveys of 1983 and 1990 suggests that popular notions of
ÔnecessitiesÕ — and hence income required to acquire or achieve them — do indeed rise
as overall incomes rise.
However, purely relative measures, like the half mean contemporary income line
available from the HBAI analysis, can generate paradoxes particularly in the short-
term. As Brian Nolan discusses in his contribution, with recent rapid growth in
Ireland, poverty in an absolute sense has fallen dramatically, but relative poverty has
risen. The latter jars with popular perceptions of the rising living standards of the
poor. Conversely, in several post-Soviet economies, overall living standards have
collapsed but purely relative measures can show no increase in ÔpovertyÕ — despite
the large numbers living at levels well below what would only recently have been
thought of as poverty.
A possible resolution of such paradoxes is that societyÕs notions of poverty are
generally relative, but they adjust to changes in general living standards with a lag.
As a result, if the rate of growth diverges greatly from the longer-term trend,
changes in relative measures can conflict with popular perceptions (even if in the
longer term they come back into line).
It should also be noted that recent Government statements have used relative
measures to describe the extent of the problem. A switch to using Ôeasier to achieveÕ
absolute measures would generate accusations of double standards between
criticising its predecessors and measuring its own performance.
Other issues in measuring incomes
Several other issues arise with any attempt to measure income distribution or
produce income-based poverty measures. Some of those most relevant to the current
UK statistics follow.
¥ Should the focus be on fractions of mean income or of median income? If
the reason for a focus on relative incomes is participation in contemporary society
it could be argued that, say, Bill GatesÕ income is not relevant to participation in
societyÕs mainstream. Arguments like this would suggest focus on the median as
more representative. But this is not always so obvious: it would seem odd, for
instance, to say that few people were ÔpoorÕ in pre-1789 France just because the
majority — including the median — had so little, even though a substantial group
had so much.
¥ Should the focus be on poverty gaps rather than headcounts? The current
HBAI series concentrates on headcounts of numbers below particular thresholds.
But using these as targets could be dangerous — changes which moved people
towards the Ôpoverty lineÕ even by a substantial amount — but not across it — would
not show up, but a small change taking someone across it would. Policy-makers
might be tempted to focus disproportionately on those just below the line rather
than those with the worst problems. But measuring poverty gaps requires good
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statistics for the lowest incomes. At present DSS does not regard the statistics for
the lowest incomes (some of them negative) in the surveys as reliable.
¥ How to deal with housing costs? If the focus is on incomes before housing
costs (BHC), higher rents can lead to apparently higher incomes because of the
way they increase Housing Benefit (part of net income) even though the recipients
are not in any meaningful way better off. Looking at after housing costs (AHC)
incomes removes this problem but introduces a new one — where higher costs
represent improved housing quality it is inappropriate to deduct them in the way
calculating AHC incomes does. An ideal measure would avoid these problems by
including an element of imputed rent for owner-occupiers and those paying sub-
market rents. But there is no way of estimating these amounts that is likely to
prove robust enough for use in sensitive official statistics.
¥ Which equivalence scale to use? Sensitivity analysis published with HBAI
generally shows that aggregate estimates of those with low incomes are robust to
the equivalence scale used. But this is not the case for sub-groups. If the
emphasis of policy is on reducing child poverty, for instance, the very low weights
given to young children by the McClements scale become an issue.
¥ What about the social wage? Current policy is to increase public spending on
the NHS and education faster than GDP, and to ensure that low income areas
benefit more from them. This could have major effects on the overall standard of
living of poor households (for whom health care and education are relatively much
more important), but will not show up in the income statistics of the kind used in
HBAI.
¥ How to allow for persistence or recurrence of low income? Persistent or
repeated low income is likely to be a more serious problem than transitory low
income, so there are good arguments for using data from panel studies to
measure their extent. However, of necessity such measures are only available with
an even longer lag than those for cross-sections. Detecting whether persistence
has increased or decreased from such sources will take even longer — particularly
if, as seems likely, durations change with the state of the economic cycle.
¥ How quickly can the measures be produced? There are technical constraints
on the speed with which accurate statistics can be produced, and there is at
present a significant lag before they come out. For instance, adjustment of
estimates of the highest incomes relies on tax data (the ÔSPI adjustmentÕ), while
the sensitivity of the figures has led to a system of independent checking. Clearly
resources devoted to the task can make a difference. Some of the most important
economic indicators such as the RPI or unemployment statistics (even those based
on the Labour Force Survey) are able to give a picture of where we were in the
much more recent past than we have for income distribution. This may be
unavoidable, but there may be ways of producing Ôleading indicatorsÕ which give a
better idea of where we are now, for instance: numbers receiving benefits (and
their durations); workless households from the Labour Force Survey; New Earnings
Survey data on low wages; modelling of changes in tax and benefits structures
and values relative to trends in other incomes.
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¥ Single or multiple measures? This discussion immediately highlights a problem.
A single measure of income poverty will always have something wrong with it. On
the other hand, multiple measures (of the kind being used as Ôindicators of
successÕ at present) run the danger of becoming fuzzy and ultimately meaningless
as it becomes possible almost always to point to some of them as showing
ÔsuccessÕ (while critics equally can always find something to show ÔfailureÕ).
Avoiding this either requires some of the indicators to be given more prominence
or for some kind of composite ÔindexÕ to be used (but see John MicklewrightÕs
contribution for discussion of the issues this raises).
Measures beyond income
There are thus difficulties in measuring ÔincomeÕ definitively. Even if it could be
measured accurately, income by itself clearly only measures part of peopleÕs standard
of living or well-being. For both reasons there has been growing interest in looking at
measures of deprivation, which go beyond simply examining cash incomes. One
motivation of studies like the Breadline Britain surveys (and the 1999 Poverty and
Social Exclusion survey reported in Gordon et al., 2000) is to indicate what level of
income is necessary to avoid deprivation in the sense of being unable to afford
popularly defined ÔnecessitiesÕ. But another use and motivation for such studies is that
they may show deprivation or lack of ability to participate in society in dimensions
other than simply material consumption. Current use of the phrase Ôsocial exclusionÕ
implies an interest in these wider dimensions.
First, Breadline Britain-type measures may help solve part of the Irish/post-Soviet
paradox referred to above. If societyÕs perceptions do indeed lag behind sudden
changes in living standards, measures using such deprivation indicators may show
more appropriate trends. The Irish approach described by Brian Nolan shows how
they can be combined with income measures to produce trends in Ôconsistent
povertyÕ. It should be noted, however, that an absolute/relative issue arises here too,
depending on whether the deprivation indicators are ÔrebasedÕ each year to allow for
changing perceptions.
Second, if there is an interest in wider measures of well-being or social inclusion,
other measures going beyond income will be needed, for instance covering
dimensions such as:
— health and life expectancy;
— education and literacy;
— security or ÔprecaritÕ of income;
— control over oneÕs life/political participation; and
— worklessness or lack of other forms of productive activity or role (such as caring).
These could be combined into a single measure, as the UN does with its Human
Development Index (indeed policy could focus on a version of the HDI itself).
However, if we are dealing with distinct dimension of peopleÕs lives — albeit closely
related — rolling them up into a single measure is inappropriate.
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Criteria for official measures
An official measure has to satisfy four criteria.
¥ Political credibility
— A clear decision on which measure or measures to focus on is needed soon,
particularly in relation to child poverty.
— It will be hard to move away from focus on a 50 per cent mean/60 per cent
median relative income line at least as one central indicator.
— Multiple measures are open to Ôpicking and choosingÕ, losing the clear definition
of any target.
¥ Policy credibility
— If Ôanti-povertyÕ policies succeed, the key indicators should go down.
— So if cash ÔisnÕt the only thing that mattersÕ, it would be odd just to measure cash.
¥ Public credibility
— If the level or trend in the measure is very different from that generated by
consensual/Breadline Britain-type measures, there is probably something wrong
with it.
— If the measure is out of line with what poor people themselves think is
happening there is probably something wrong with it.
— It needs to survive the Irish/post-Soviet paradox (unless, of course, boom and
bust have indeed been abolished foreverÉ).
¥ Technical credibility
— No fancy adjustments, however theoretically desirable, which have a wide
margin of uncertainty (sadly ruling out something like a ÔWith Housing IncomeÕ
measure which would resolve the BHC/AHC problem as suggested in Gardiner 
et al., 1995)
— It has to generate a robust time series, not just for the recent past but also for
up to two decades.
— It would be useful to have international comparability so that trends can be
measured against comparable countries.
A possible resolution: The Starfish and the Good Life
A way of resolving these conflicting pressures might be to divide the problem in two.
¥ The Starfish. The first part would be a core measure (or possibly two) of income/
material living standards. This could be an HBAI-type income measure, together
with a Breadline Britain-type deprivation measure (or indeed a combination of the
two as in Ireland). Measurement of policy success could focus on this core.
However, it would be supplemented by ÔspikesÕ showing whether the trends revealed
were vulnerable to changes in technical assumptions of the kinds discussed above:
depth of poverty; treatment of housing costs; persistence/duration; the social
wage; equivalence scales and assumptions about sharing within the household;
etc. Giving prominence to the core would give a clear policy focus, but the ÔspikesÕ
would ring alarm bells if they consistently revealed different trends.
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¥ The Good Life. The second part would be a separate set of indicators designed to
capture other aspects of well-being or participation (in much the same way as the
existing DSS Ôindicators of successÕ) going beyond cash income and material living
standards. There need to be multiple indicators because they are measuring
different things (by contrast with the spikes of the Starfish which are needed
because our income measures are imperfect).
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MEASURING AND TARGETING POVERTY: THE IRISH EXAMPLE
Brian Nolan, The Economic and Social Research Institute
1. Introduction
With the launch of its National Anti-Poverty Strategy Statement (NAPS) in 1997,
Ireland became the first European Union member state to adopt a global poverty
target. This target is framed in terms of a poverty measure incorporating both
relative income and direct measures of deprivation, developed at the Economic and
Social Research Institute. With the UK now having an explicit political commitment to
ending child poverty over a 20 year period, the Irish experience in terms of
measuring poverty and framing an official poverty target are of particular relevance.
Here the evolution of this poverty target and measure are briefly described. Recent
trends in income poverty and deprivation, and in this combined income and
deprivation poverty measure, are then presented. Finally, these results are used to
illuminate central issues about framing poverty targets and measuring progress in
reducing poverty.1
2. The Irish Poverty Target and Measure
The Irish National Anti-Poverty Strategy starts by setting out a definition of poverty in
the following terms:
ÒPeople are living in poverty if their income and resources (material, cultural
and social) are so inadequate as to preclude them from having a standard of
living which is regarded as acceptable by Irish society generally. As a result
of inadequate income and resources people may be excluded and
marginalized from participating in activities which are considered the norm
for other people in societyÓ (NAPS 1997 p. 3)
The overall or global target set out in the original NAPS Strategy Statement is then:
ÒOver the period, 1997-2007, the National Anti-Poverty Strategy will aim at
considerably reducing the numbers of those who are Ôconsistently poorÕ from 
9 to 15 per cent to less than 5 to 10 per cent, as measured by the ESRI.Ó
(NAPS 1997 p. 9)
This target relates to the numbers both below relative income poverty lines and
experiencing what research at the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) has
termed Ôbasic deprivationÕ, measured by non-monetary indicators such as not being
able to afford a warm coat, a second pair of shoes or adequate heating. 
A number of specific targets in the areas of educational disadvantage, unemployment,
income adequacy, urban and rural disadvantage were also set out, but the global
poverty reduction target is absolutely central to NAPS, and the fact that Ireland now
has such an official poverty target represents a major step forward. When the
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1 See Nolan (1999) and Layte, Nolan and Whelan (2000) for a more detailed treatment.
Strategy was initiated the extent of poverty used as the baseline for the target was
taken from the 1994 Living in Ireland Survey, but when data for 1997 became
available the original target was revised, as we shall see: first, though, we need to
describe in more detail how the measure of Ôconsistent povertyÕ was developed.
Poverty is generally conceived as inability to participate in the ordinary life of society
due to lack of resources. Non-monetary indicators of deprivation have been
developed and used in poverty research by, among others, Townsend (1979), Gordon
et al (1995), Mack & Lansley (1985) and Gordon et al (2000) in the UK, Muffels
(1993) with Dutch data, and Hallerod (1995) for Sweden. Research at the ESRI with
Irish data over a number of years has made use of such non-monetary indicators,
and explored in detail the relationship between them and reported household incomes
(e.g. Callan, Nolan, and Whelan, 1993 and Nolan and Whelan, 1996). This has
brought out the extent to which householdÕs deprivation levels are influenced not only
by current income but also by resources and experiences (particularly in the labour
market) over a long period. This means that low income at a point in time may not
on its own be a reliable measure of exclusion arising from lack of resources, and thus
poverty lines based wholly on current income may be problematic. 
Using Irish data we sought to construct a more reliable measure by combining low
income with suitable direct indicators of deprivation — items generally regarded as
necessities which individuals or families must do without because they cannot afford
them. Factor analysis of Irish data on non-monetary indicators for 1987 revealed
three underlying dimensions of deprivation which we called basic, secondary and
housing dimensions. The Ôbasic deprivationÕ cluster included not being able to afford
heating, a substantial meal once a day, new rather than second-hand clothes, a meal
with meat, chicken or fish every second day, a warm overcoat, two pairs of strong
shoes, a ÔroastÕ or equivalent once a week, and not falling into arrears or debt paying
everyday household expenses. These items were perceived to be socially necessities:
Òthings that every household should be able to have and that nobody should have to
do withoutÓ. They were possessed by most people, reflected rather basic aspects of
current material deprivation, and clustered together. 
On this basis we concluded that these were most suitable as indicators of the
underlying generalised deprivation that one is trying to measure. Those on relatively
low incomes and experiencing basic deprivation were then identified as experiencing
generalised deprivation or exclusion due to lack of resources. When we looked at the
other features that one might expect to be associated with exclusion — such as low
levels of savings and high levels of economic strain and psychological distress — this
combined measure performed much better than income on its own. 
In 1994, about 15 per cent of households were below the 60 per cent relative income
poverty line and experiencing basic deprivation, while 9 per cent were below half
average income and experiencing such deprivation — the Ônine to fifteen per cent
consistently poorÕ figure referred to in the NAPS target. It must be emphasised that
this combined poverty measure was never intended to be a mixture of relative
income and absolute or fixed deprivation indicators. Instead, the need to adapt and
augment the non-monetary deprivation indicators in the light of improved living
standards, changing perception about what constitute necessities, and potential
transformations of the underlying structure of deprivation, was central to the
conceptual underpinnings. Actually implementing this adaptation, however, raises
issues that are particularly difficult to address in a period of very rapid growth, as we
shall see. 
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To summarise, the central aim of a poverty measure is to capture sustained
inadequate command over financial resources. One way of addressing the limitations
of low income is to complement it with cross-sectional information on non-monetary
deprivation indicators. Information on the persistence of low income over time, where
longitudinal data are available, would also be very valuable and a ÔpersistentÕ poverty
measure is likely to end up identifying many of the same households as poor as the
cross-sectional ÔconsistentÕ poverty measure. 
3. Recent Trends in Different Poverty Measures
We now describe recent trends in different measures of poverty using data from the
1994 and 1997 waves of the Living in Ireland Survey, the Irish component of the
European Household Panel Survey. A full description of the 1994 and 1997 surveys
can be found in Callan et al (1996), and (1999) respectively.2 This period was one of
remarkable growth in Ireland, with GDP increasing by 7-8 per cent per annum — the
ÔCeltic TigerÕ phenomenon. Economic growth rates exceeded those in most OECD
countries, underpinned by a social partnership approach to wage setting in operation
since the late 1980s. This linked centralised wage bargaining to input from the social
partners on tax and welfare policy, within a broader consensus about development
strategy. Economic growth on this scale had a major impact on unemployment, which
had risen very rapidly during the 1980s to reach 18 per cent of the labour force. It
still remained as high as 16 per cent by 1994, but subsequently fell rapidly, down to
11 per cent by 1997 (and has fallen a good deal further since then). With something
of a lag, long-term unemployment has also fallen very considerably.
This translated into substantial increases in average household income over the 1994-
1997 period. An increase of 20 per cent in that average in nominal terms was seen,
at a time when consumer prices rose by only 6 per cent. Adjusting household
incomes for differences in size and composition, the increase in mean incomes was
larger, at about 22 per cent. However, the impact this had on households depended
on their main source of income, because social welfare support rates, while increasing
well ahead of prices, did not keep pace with the exceptionally rapid rise in incomes
from the market. Key social welfare pension rates, for example, rose by 12 per cent
in nominal terms. 
Trends in relative income poverty over this period of unprecedented economic growth
are shown in Table 1.1. Household income as reported in the two surveys is used to
create relative income poverty lines, based on proportions of mean equivalised
disposable household income (see Callan et al 1999 for a detailed description).3 We
see that, despite the buoyant economic situation, the percentage of households below
the relative income lines increased over the period, consistently from the 40 per cent
up to the 60 per cent line. The percentage of persons below those lines showed a
similar trend. Thus a substantial increase in average household income, shared in by
those on lower incomes, was accompanied by, if anything, an increase in relative
income poverty rates. (This is also the case if relative lines based on the median
rather than mean income are employed).
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2 There was sizeable attrition between Waves 1 and 4, taken into account in the weights applied to the latter. Detailed
validation suggests that attrition was not associated with characteristics such as income or deprivation levels or social
welfare recipiency, and did not to have a significant impact on the structure of the sample.
3 The equivalence scale employed reflects the relationships implicit in the rates of Irish social welfare payments in the
late 1980s: where the household head is given a value 1, each extra adult is given a value of 0.66 and each child a
value of 0.33. The pattern shown here holds across a range of scales.
Over any prolonged period when general living standards are changing, perceptions
and expectations as to what is acceptable can also be expected to change, and this
provides the essential rationale for using relative rather than fixed income poverty
lines. However, it is clearly also important to know what has been happening to real
incomes. At a minimum, one would certainly want to be able to distinguish between a
situation where the incomes of the poor are rising in real terms but lagging behind
the average in the society, and one where real incomes of the poor are falling while
the average is stable. Given the scale of real income growth in Ireland over the
period in question, income standards adjusted upwards over time only in line with
prices show a very different picture. If, for example, a line set at 60 per cent of
average income in 1987 were indexed to prices from then on, the poverty rate on this
basis would have fallen from about 30 per cent in 1987 and 20 per cent in 1994 to
11 per cent in 1997. Thus, in a period of rapid though uneven income growth,
relative income and ÔrealÕ income poverty lines provide radically different perspectives
on the evolution of poverty.
Against this background, deprivation levels as measured by the range of non-
monetary indicators available in our surveys fell substantially. Taking the eight items
in our basic deprivation index, the percentage scoring zero on this index rose from 
75 per cent to 85 per cent, while the percentage scoring more than one fell from 
12 per cent to 7 per cent. (This decline is also seen with the other indicators, in what
we have called the secondary and housing dimensions.) Table 1.2 then shows the
percentage of households below the relative income lines and experiencing basic
deprivation for 1994 and 1997. We see that the percentage below the 60 per cent
line and experiencing basic deprivation fell from 15 per cent to 10 per cent, and the
percentage below the 50 per cent relative income line and experiencing such
deprivation also fell though less sharply. Thus, combining relative income poverty
lines with a deprivation criterion (which is itself held fixed) gives a very different
picture to that shown by relative income lines alone. 
Table 1.1: Percentage of Households Below Relative Income Poverty Lines,
Living in Ireland Surveys 1994 and 1997
Equivalence scale/Poverty line Percentage of households below line
1994 1997
40% relative income line 7% 10%
50% relative income line 21% 22%
60% relative income line 34% 35%
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These results revealed that the numbers below the 60 per cent relative income line
and experiencing basic deprivation had already fallen by 1997 to the level the original
NAPS global poverty reduction target aimed at for 2007. As a result, the global
poverty reduction target in the National Anti Poverty Strategy was revised in 1999,
and is now to reduce Ôconsistent povertyÕ to below 5 per cent by 2004 (NAPS 1999).
A central question has to be asked about the consistent poverty measure as currently
constituted in the light of these results: as living standards rise, has an unchanged
set of indicators continued to adequately capture what is regarded as generalised
deprivation? The set of indicators included in the basic deprivation measure has
remained unchanged from 1994 to 1997 — indeed, since 1987 when we first had data
available — and one needs to be sure that this measure is not missing fundamental
changes in expectations and in what it means to be poor. Over the whole period from
1987 to 1997, expectations do indeed appear to have risen in line with the general
upward trend in the extent of possession of items. As a result, items such as central
heating, a telephone, a car, a colour TV, and presents for friends and family at least
once a year came to be perceived as necessities by a substantial majority of
households. However, not all socially perceived necessities are suitable for
incorporation into the combined income/deprivation measure, but only those tapping
the underlying generalised deprivation one is attempting to capture. Factor analysis
shows that these five items continue to load on what we have called secondary
deprivation dimension, rather than clustering with the basic items (Layte et al 1999). 
We have also examined the additional households who would be counted as poor if
one did indeed broaden the deprivation element of the measure by incorporating
these five additional items. In terms of self-assessed economic strain, psychological
distress and fatalism the consistent picture was that the profile of these households
was similar to that of the Ônon-poorÕ and strikingly different from the Ôconsistent poorÕ.
For example, almost 40 per cent of those counted as poor with our current combined
income and deprivation measure report Òextreme difficultyÓ making ends meet. This
compares to only about 11 per cent of the additional group who would be counted as
poor if the deprivation criteria were expanded and under 5 per cent of those who are
non-poor even with the expanded criteria. A similar pattern emerged when people
were asked about their level of satisfaction with their financial situation, and in terms
of levels of psychological distress. The combined income and deprivation measure as
originally constituted thus continues to identify a set of households experiencing
generalised deprivation resulting from a lack of resources, who are suffering a degree
of economic strain and general psychological difficulties that mark them out from the
Table 1.2: Percentage of Households Below Relative Income Thresholds
and Experiencing Basic Deprivation, Living in Ireland Surveys
1994 and 1997
Relative Income Line % of households below line and experiencing
enforced basic deprivation
1994 1997
40% line 2.4% 3.0%
50% line 8.9% 7.3%
60% line 14.9% 9.9%
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rest of the population. The decline in numbers poor by this measure captures the
effects of improvements in living standards that are not reflected in the relative
income line results. 
4. Targeting Poverty
What then are the main lessons to be learned from the Irish experience with poverty
targets so far? Setting out an overall standard against which success or failure of the
national effort to combat poverty can be assessed is enormously important. By doing
so, the Government both acknowledges its responsibility for reducing the overall
extent of poverty and gives policy commitments content and meaning. The adoption
of a national poverty target fundamentally alters the nature of the national discourse
on poverty and the way anti-poverty policies are assessed. Obtaining widespread
agreement on the broad definition, the general meaning to be attributed to the term
poverty, has not so far proved to be a major obstacle in the Irish case. While some
might quarrel with the resolutely relative conceptualisation spelt out in that definition,
it emerged from a lengthy consultative process and has been accepted by successive
Governments. 
What is much more problematic is arriving at a measure and target or set of targets to
encapsulate this definition. The Irish NAPS Strategy did not set out an explicit
justification for its choice of target and measure. Some have criticised the target itself
for being insufficiently ambitious in the scale of the reduction sought, and indeed for
not concentrating entirely on the numbers below relative income lines. If the latter
course had been adopted, however, it is hard to see how such a relative income poverty
target showing absolutely no progress — or even a worsening — in a period when
unemployment and deprivation levels declined so rapidly could have retained either
political or public credibility. On the other hand, others criticise the inclusion of the
relative income line component, regarding this as a measure of inequality rather than
poverty, and would prefer to concentrate entirely on a fixed set of deprivation measures
or on real rather than relative income standards. Over time, that would clearly be
inconsistent with the relative definition of poverty explicitly adopted in the strategy.
Adapting the deprivation element of the consistent poverty measure over time as
living patterns alter poses particular problems. An element of judgement is
necessarily involved, which may affect the precise level of the poverty measure at a
particular point in time. While less serious in a measure aiming to capture broad
directions and trends in poverty, this may be seen as a problem in a poverty target.
It would also be undesirable in the latter context for changes in the key poverty
number to be perceived as emerging from a Ôblack boxÕ, given the importance of
public acceptance of, and identification with, the poverty target. The fact that basic
deprivation is measured in terms of items with which people can readily identify —
such as not being able to heat oneÕs house or have adequate clothing — is one of the
arguments for using deprivation indicators in the first place. In the same vein, it is
essential to ensure maximum transparency in the process of adapting the items over
time as that becomes necessary, which it undoubtedly will at some point. 
The other difficulty with the combined income and deprivation measure as the sole
poverty target is most pronounced in a period of rapid economic growth such as the
one Ireland has been experiencing. If a global poverty reduction target framed in
terms of the combined income/deprivation poverty measure is to be reached it seems
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likely that in normal circumstances other measures, such as the numbers in relative
income poverty, would also have to be falling. The unusual situation in which that
may not hold is when average incomes are growing exceptionally rapidly, when those
on low incomes share in that growth and see their real living standards rise
significantly, but when they lag somewhat behind the mean — which is precisely what
has been happening in Ireland. Even augmenting the set of deprivation measures to
take into account changing expectations may not then be enough to alter this picture. 
Over a lengthy period when living standards stabilise, societal expectations may
indeed catch up and adjust fully to higher average incomes. Higher real incomes and
lower deprivation levels, however welcome, would not then mean that everyone was
able to participate fully in society: they would not represent a sustained reduction in
poverty. In the shorter term, however — over which a poverty target may be
operating — the fact that real and relative income levels are diverging so markedly
cannot be simply ignored. The key challenge in setting and monitoring poverty
targets is to capture these realities, but also take into account the long-term
consequences of lower incomes, and social security rates in particular, lagging behind
the average.
At a minimum, this means that a poverty target should be re-based regularly,
perhaps every five years or so, rather than cast in stone. More fundamentally,
though, it may be worth broadening the scope of poverty targets to encompass more
distinct elements. As well as the combined income/deprivation measure, one could
have distinct targets for the key elements underpinning it. One could, for example,
think in terms of a set of tiered and inter-related poverty reduction targets along the
following lines.
A) Priority is given to ensuring that those on low incomes see their real incomes
rise, and their deprivation levels using a fixed set of indicators decline.
B) Next, relative incomes and deprivation levels using a set of deprivation
indicators which changes as far as possible in line with expectations should
produce a decline in the combined income/deprivation measure.
C) Finally, the proportion of the population falling below relative income poverty
lines should be declining. 
Each of these tiers can be regarded as encapsulating a necessary but not sufficient
condition for a sustainable reduction in poverty.
A) Reflects the assumption that if real incomes of the poor are falling and their
deprivation levels rising, then even if their relative positions were improving
most people would see poverty as increasing. 
B) Reflects the assumption that the combined effect of changes in relative
incomes and deprivation should be to reduce the extent of what is regarded
as exclusion at a point in time. 
C) Reflects the assumption that in the long term, people will not be able to
participate in what comes to be regarded as ordinary living standards if their
incomes fall too far below the average: a sustained reduction in poverty can
then be achieved only by bringing them closer to average incomes. 
There is a real dilemma here. Atkinson (1997) for example advocates an annual
Poverty Report presenting a range of information as well as an informed commentary:
one of its objectives would be to divert attention from a single number. From an
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analytical point of view, and in order to inform both the policy-makers and the public
as fully as possible, this makes perfect sense. From a political perspective, however, a
key element in the exercise is to have a national commitment to attaining a clearly-
articulated target, with regular monitoring of performance crucial to the credibility of
that commitment and of the GovernmentÕs anti-poverty strategy. This means that
there has to be a headline number, or very limited set of numbers, against which
success or failure will be judged. So the way in which the official target is framed is
still critical. It has to try to meet the need for a headline number, but still seek to
encapsulate key elements of the complexity of the underlying reality. 
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MEASUREMENT OF POVERTY: IMPLICATIONS OF THE
US APPROACH
Professor Sheldon Danziger, University of Michigan
Contrasting the US approach with that in continental Europe and the UK, Sheldon
Danziger described the way in which the US poverty line was in most respects an
absolute one, with a fixed real value. The official poverty line was established in the
mid-1960s, and is updated annually to reflect changes in consumer prices. A recent
review of the official measure of poverty by a panel of experts convened by the
National Research Council (Measuring Poverty: A New Approach, edited by C. Citro
and R.Michael, 1995) suggested that it should be revised to reflect not only price
changes, but also changes in the consumption of basic necessities. This would lead to
something above pure price-indexation. 
The panelÕs recommendations are not likely to be implemented; a previous detailed
study of poverty measurement carried out in the mid-1970s was also not
implemented. As a result, Danziger suggested that care be taken in deciding on an
official line. In his view, the US experience suggests that once an official poverty line
is adopted it is likely to stay in place for a long time, as any proposed change will be
politically problematic. 
The US line can be changed by a Presidential administration, without a vote of
Congress. However, any change tends to produce some groups whose share of the
poverty population increases, and other groups whose share decreases. Because
funding in a number of social programs is a function of the poverty rate, these
changes have financial implications. For example, the NRC recommended that the
poverty line be adjusted geographically to account for differential costs of housing.
Currently, the poverty line is constant across the country. If this change were
implemented, the poverty rate would fall in states with low housing costs and
increase in those with high housing costs. As a result, members of Congress from the
low housing cost states would protest the proposed change because it would reduce
the amount of federal funds flowing into their states. In addition, Presidential
administrations are reluctant to make a change in the poverty line that would show
the poverty rate increasing in the period of their leadership. 
Danziger also cautioned against adopting a single relative measure of poverty. He
pointed to a case, not unlike recent experience in Ireland, where the incomes of the
population — rich, middle class, and poor — all increased by a substantial percentage
over a several year period. He felt that the Government should get credit for raising
the living standards of the poor, even if it turned out that their incomes did not rise
more than the median income. In this situation, absolute poverty declines sharply,
but relative poverty does not change.
As a result, DanzigerÕs advice would be to use an absolute target as the centre of any
ÔstarfishÕ of poverty indicators of the kind described by John Hills. The crucial
advantage of this is that it does produce progress if the living standards of the poor
increase. If too ambitious a target is set, the statistics will show failure, and
undermine the policy as a whole. Given the structure of modern economies, in which
technological changes and globalization have exerted downward pressure on the
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wages of less-skilled workers in most industrialized countries, a country will be doing
well if real wages at the bottom rise. By contrast it may simply be impossible to
achieve a relative target in which the wages of the less-skilled grow at a faster rate
than that of the most-skilled.
The US target (with a starting value which was equivalent to more than 40 per cent
of median income) was set during the 1960s ÔWar on PovertyÕ, with the idea that
elimination of income poverty in a generation against this absolute line was a modest
but achievable goal. After then, it would be time to set a new goal. Some leading
scholars predicted that this goal would be achieved by 1980. Yet, the official poverty
rate in 1999 was no lower than it was in 1973. The persisting high poverty rate is one
reason why the US has felt little pressure to raise its poverty line, even though, in
real terms, it has fallen to about one-third of median income.
The US Census Bureau is able to produce income-based measures of poverty within
about 10 months. Each March, the Current Population Survey is fielded to a sample of
households. For example, in March 2000, respondents were asked to report on their
incomes for calendar year 1999. By October 2000, the Census Bureau had analyzed
the data and released the official poverty rate for 1999. Deprivation indicators tend to
come from external sources and take longer, so it would be better not to combine
them, as that would delay reporting on progress.
Overall the objective should be to keep it simple, and look for progress in five years
against a hierarchy of measures:
¥ an absolute line (or maybe one rising slightly in real terms);
¥ deprivation indicators; and
¥ only then relative lines which imply a reduction in inequality.
Continental European welfare states have achieved low poverty against relative lines,
but he would be wary of using such measures for an ÔAnglo-AmericanÕ economy. It is
very hard to have a Ôrising tide raising all boatsÕ, so it is better to aim to constrain the
rise in inequality to be slow. However, if a relative target is to be used, it should be
against the median rather than the mean (as the latter is driven to a great extent by
the incomes of the very rich).
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POVERTY: THE OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN
Jonathan Bradshaw, Social Policy Research Unit, University of York
Introduction
In the early 1990s, long before child poverty became such a prominent issue on the
political agenda, the ESRC decided to fund a programme on Children aged 5 to 16.
The ESRC programme was focussed on the new sociology of childhood. I had been
concerned that although we knew about the increase in child poverty we were doing
very little to monitor its effect in Britain (Bradshaw 1990, Kumar 1995, Cornia and
Danziger 1996). So I decided to put in a proposal on the outcomes of child poverty.
Despite its highly structuralist nature, it got funded. The project consisted of:
¥ a review of child poverty using the child as the unit of analysis of the Family
Resources Survey, the British Household Panel Survey and the Breadline Britain
Survey; and
¥ a comparative analysis of child poverty using the child as a unit of analysis and
involving the Luxembourg Income Survey, the European Community Household
Panel Survey and OECD data.
The results of this work have been published elsewhere (Whiteford, Kennedy and
Bradshaw 1996, Bradshaw 2000, Bradshaw and Barnes 1999, Adelman and Bradshaw
(1998)) and the international comparisons have now been overtaken by the recent
UNICEF (2000) report.
But there was third part of the project. We sought to establish by review and some
secondary analysis of the British Household Panel Survey what had happened to
children as a result of the increase in poverty. The results of that work (by chance)
have a direct bearing on the Opportunity for All indicators.
This presentation draws on the report (Bradshaw (forthcoming in early 2001)) to
provide a critical perspective on the Opportunity for All indicators for children.
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Session 2: Wider Aspects of Poverty and 
Social Exclusion
Praise for Opportunity for All
But before I get critical let me emphasise that:
1. I applaud the commitment to abolish child poverty in 20 years;
2. it is a challenge to social scientists to produce a set of criteria against which the
anti poverty strategy should be reviewed and we should respond;
3. the criteria proposed in Opportunity for All have the merit of going beyond the
routine income definitions of poverty;
4. they cover physical, cognitive, behavioural and emotional elements of childrenÕs
lives; and
5. ten out of the 13 are particularly admirable, because they also focus on outcomes
rather than inputs.
So if I am critical in the next section of this presentation it is not just because I am
curmudgeonly or mean spirited. It is because I see this as a great opportunity to
press forward — towards an Annual Report on the State of BritainÕs Children. I believe
that this country needs an agency that cares for children — in the face of social and
economic change. Other countries have child ombudsmen, child councils, even child
parliaments. We have a mass of ad hoc reports on specific aspects of childrenÕs well-
being, for example health (see Woodroffe et al 1993, Botting et al (1996)). We have
the New Policy InstituteÕs efforts (Howarth 1999a and 1999b). But the only official
(fairly) comprehensive review is by the Office of National Statistics with a report 
(CSO 1994) on children nearly seven years old — and now Opportunity for All.
What are the criteria for a good set of indicators?
The following seem to me to be the qualities that a set of indicators designed to
monitor the GovernmentÕs anti (child) poverty strategy should have.
1. They should represent the range of elements of well-being — physical, cognitive,
behavioural and mental/emotional.
2. The indicators should be related to poverty.
3. They should major on outcomes (and avoid service activity or input variables).
4. They should be based on existing routinely and regularly collected data (or data
which could be collected). 
5. The data should be national.
6. It would be really nice if we could use at least some of them to compare how we
are doing with other countries (Micklewright and Stewart 1999). 
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In the light of these criteria my criticisms of the Opportunity for All indicators follow.
¥ They are too narrow in scope — in particular there is too little on physical health,
mental health and subjective well-being.
¥ Not all the indicators are related to poverty.
¥ They are too (Whitehall) departmentally based — it as if each government
department has been asked to nominate two or three measures.
¥ Some of them are inputs not outcomes.
¥ There is as yet no source of data for some of the indicators and for some the
source is not regular enough.
¥ The Sure Start indicators are not national.
I will not go through each indicator in turn but I have summarised my specific
criticisms in the attached Table. It covers the thirteen child indicators and four child-
related indicators included in the indicator for people of working age. 
What other indicators of the outcome of child poverty might be
considered?
The following is a list of outcomes of child poverty that might be added to the list of
Opportunity for All indicators. These are all outcomes examined in our review, which
are known to have an association with child poverty and for which there is data
available at national level.
¥ Post-neonatal mortality rates.
¥ Child death rates.
¥ The class or income differential between both these rates.
¥ Accidental deaths on the roads and in the home.
¥ Low birth weight.
¥ Selected congenital anomalies.
¥ Self or parental reported chronic illness.
¥ Some infectious diseases.
¥ Dental caries.
¥ Obesity.
¥ Child neglect and physical child abuse.
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¥ Children in temporary accommodation.
¥ Satisfaction with neighbourhood.
¥ Repossessions involving children.
¥ SDQ scores of children aged 4-15 in the Annual Health Survey of England.
¥ Self esteem scores for children aged 10-15 in the BHPS.
¥ GHQ scores of young people aged 16-21 (or more) in the Annual Health Survey
of England.
¥ Mental illness.
In addition to this there are some other indicators that could be included in an index
designed to monitor child poverty and which were not included in our review because
they are not outcomes.
¥ Per cent of children in families receiving Income Support/Income related JSA
(available from DSS administrative statistics).
¥ Per cent of children living in wards defined as (say) the 10 per cent most deprived
in Britain (available from the Oxford Index 99 group).
¥ Per cent of wards with more than 50 per cent (say) of children in families receiving
Income Support/income related JSA (available from the Oxford Index 99 group).
¥ Per cent of children in households lacking three or more socially perceived
necessities (available along with a host of other poverty/social exclusion variables
from the Survey of Poverty and Social Exclusion in Britain (Gordon et al 2000) and
which could be made available regularly by incorporating questions into the GHS 
or FRS).
¥ Any of the indicators of social exclusion now included in the European Community
Household Panel Survey.1
While there is room to argue about any of these indicators, it is to be hoped that they
illustrate that there is room to build on the list in Opportunity for All.
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1 The following indicators are available in the ECHP:— percentage of children in households dissatisfied with their financial
situation; with difficulties in making ends meet; unable to save regularly; who cannot afford three or more basic
necessities; whose financial situation has deteriorated since the previous year; with minimum equivalised income
required to make ends meet more than 105 per cent of actual income; percentage of couples with children and/or lone
parents with three or more housing problems; with financial burdens or debts.
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o
f 
S
u
re
 S
ta
rt
 i
n
 t
h
es
e 
ar
ea
s
an
d
 t
h
es
e 
in
d
ic
at
o
rs
 a
re
 e
it
h
er
 S
u
re
 S
ta
rt
 P
u
b
lic
S
er
vi
ce
 A
g
re
em
en
ts
 (
PS
A
s)
 o
r 
O
u
tp
u
t 
an
d
Pe
rf
o
rm
an
ce
 A
n
al
ys
is
 (
O
PA
s)
 i
n
d
ic
at
o
rs
, 
it
 i
s
su
re
ly
 n
o
t 
ri
g
h
t 
to
 p
re
se
n
t 
th
em
 a
s 
p
ar
t 
o
f 
th
e
in
d
ic
at
o
rs
 d
es
ig
n
ed
 t
o
 e
va
lu
at
e 
a 
n
at
io
n
al
 a
n
ti
-
p
ov
er
ty
 s
tr
at
eg
y.
 
1
.
A
n
 i
n
cr
ea
se
 i
n
 t
h
e 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
se
ve
n
-y
ea
r-
o
ld
 S
u
re
 S
ta
rt
 c
h
ild
re
n
 a
ch
ie
vi
n
g
 l
ev
el
 1
 o
r
ab
o
ve
 i
n
 t
h
e 
K
ey
 S
ta
g
e 
1
 E
n
g
lis
h
 a
n
d
 m
at
h
s
te
st
s.
 
S
u
g
g
es
ti
o
n
s 
C
ri
ti
ci
sm
s 
O
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y 
fo
r 
A
ll
in
d
ic
at
o
rs
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N
o
n
e 
N
o
n
e 
5
.
A
n
 i
n
cr
ea
se
 i
n
 t
h
e 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
1
9
-y
ea
r-
o
ld
s
w
it
h
 a
t 
le
as
t 
a 
le
ve
l 
2
 q
u
al
if
ic
at
io
n
 o
r
eq
u
iv
al
en
t 
D
ro
p
 i
t 
T
h
er
e 
is
 r
ea
so
n
 t
o
 b
e 
an
xi
o
u
s 
ab
o
u
t 
th
e 
re
lia
b
ili
ty
o
f 
th
e 
d
at
a 
o
n
 s
ch
o
o
l 
ex
cl
u
si
o
n
s 
an
d
 t
ru
an
ci
es
.
S
ch
o
o
l 
ex
cl
u
si
o
n
s 
ef
fe
ct
ed
 o
n
ly
 0
.1
6
 p
er
 c
en
t 
o
f
p
u
p
ils
 i
n
 1
9
9
7
/8
 a
n
d
 o
n
ly
 0
.7
 p
er
 c
en
t 
o
f 
h
al
f
d
ay
s 
w
er
e 
m
is
se
d
 p
er
 y
ea
r 
th
ro
u
g
h
 u
n
au
th
o
ri
se
d
p
u
p
il 
ab
se
n
ce
. 
T
h
es
e 
ve
ry
 s
m
al
l 
n
u
m
b
er
s 
ar
e
lik
el
y 
to
 b
e 
h
ig
h
ly
 s
en
si
ti
ve
 t
o
 c
h
an
g
es
 i
n
re
co
rd
in
g
 —
 u
p
w
ar
d
s 
o
r 
d
o
w
n
w
ar
d
s.
 
T
h
er
e 
is
 a
ls
o
 r
at
h
er
 w
ea
k 
ev
id
en
ce
 o
f 
th
e
as
so
ci
at
io
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
 s
ch
o
o
l 
ex
cl
u
si
o
n
s 
an
d
p
ov
er
ty
. 
4
.
A
 r
ed
u
ct
io
n
 i
n
 t
h
e 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
tr
u
an
ci
es
 a
n
d
ex
cl
u
si
o
n
 f
ro
m
 s
ch
o
o
l.
 
N
o
n
e 
N
o
n
e 
3
.
A
n
 i
n
cr
ea
se
 i
n
 t
h
e 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
th
o
se
 a
g
ed
1
1
 a
ch
ie
vi
n
g
 l
ev
el
 4
 o
r 
ab
o
ve
 i
n
 t
h
e 
ke
y 
st
ag
e
2
 t
es
ts
 f
o
r 
lit
er
ac
y 
an
d
 n
u
m
er
ac
y.
S
u
g
g
es
ti
o
n
s 
C
ri
ti
ci
sm
s 
O
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y 
fo
r 
A
ll
in
d
ic
at
o
rs
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A
 b
et
te
r 
an
d
 m
o
re
 u
p
 t
o
 d
at
e 
in
d
ic
at
o
r 
o
f 
th
e
sa
m
e 
th
in
g
 c
o
u
ld
 b
e 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
d
at
a 
o
n
 t
h
e
n
u
m
b
er
s/
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
s 
o
f 
al
l 
ch
ild
re
n
 l
iv
in
g
 i
n
fa
m
ili
es
 r
ec
ei
vi
n
g
 I
n
co
m
e 
S
u
p
p
o
rt
/I
n
co
m
e 
Te
st
ed
Jo
b
 S
ee
ke
rs
 A
llo
w
an
ce
. 
T
h
e 
n
u
m
er
at
o
r 
is
av
ai
la
b
le
 w
it
h
 l
it
tl
e 
o
r 
n
o
 d
el
ay
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
D
S
S
 a
n
d
th
e 
d
en
o
m
in
at
o
r 
is
 o
b
ta
in
ab
le
 s
im
p
ly
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e
C
h
ild
 B
en
ef
it
 r
eg
is
te
r.
 A
ll 
fa
m
ili
es
 r
ec
ei
vi
n
g
In
co
m
e 
S
u
p
p
o
rt
 a
re
 w
o
rk
le
ss
, 
o
r 
vi
rt
u
al
ly
w
o
rk
le
ss
 g
iv
en
 t
h
e 
ea
rn
in
g
s 
d
is
re
g
ar
d
s,
 a
n
d
 n
o
n
e
o
f 
th
em
 h
av
e 
ca
p
it
al
 o
r 
o
th
er
 r
es
o
u
rc
es
 (
w
h
ile
so
m
e 
o
f 
th
e 
w
o
rk
le
ss
 d
o
).
 F
u
rt
h
er
m
o
re
 t
h
an
ks
 t
o
th
e 
w
o
rk
 o
f 
th
e 
O
xf
o
rd
 S
o
ci
al
 D
ep
ri
va
ti
o
n
R
es
ea
rc
h
 U
n
it
 t
h
is
 i
n
d
ic
at
o
r 
is
 n
o
w
 p
ar
t 
o
f 
th
e
D
E
T
R
Õs
 I
n
d
ex
 o
f 
D
ep
ri
va
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 a
va
ila
b
le
 a
t
d
is
tr
ic
t,
 w
ar
d
 a
n
d
 e
n
u
m
er
at
io
n
 d
is
tr
ic
t 
le
ve
l.
T
h
er
e 
is
 n
o
 d
o
u
b
t 
th
at
 t
h
e 
in
cr
ea
se
 i
n
w
o
rk
le
ss
n
es
s 
in
 B
ri
ta
in
 h
as
 b
ee
n
 a
ss
o
ci
at
ed
 w
it
h
th
e 
in
cr
ea
se
 i
n
 c
h
ild
 p
ov
er
ty
 a
n
d
 t
h
at
 o
u
r
co
m
p
ar
at
iv
el
y 
h
ig
h
 l
ev
el
s 
o
f 
w
o
rk
le
ss
n
es
s 
ar
e 
a
re
as
o
n
 f
o
r 
ch
ild
 p
ov
er
ty
 b
ei
n
g
 h
ig
h
er
 h
er
e 
th
an
el
se
w
h
er
e.
 H
o
w
ev
er
 w
o
rk
le
ss
n
es
s 
is
 a
n
 i
n
p
u
t,
 a
ca
u
se
 o
f 
p
ov
er
ty
 r
at
h
er
 t
h
an
 a
n
 o
u
tc
o
m
e 
o
f
p
ov
er
ty
. 
It
 i
s 
al
so
 n
o
t 
in
ev
it
ab
ly
 a
ss
o
ci
at
ed
 w
it
h
p
ov
er
ty
 —
 i
n
 o
th
er
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s 
th
e 
ch
ild
re
n
 o
f
w
o
rk
le
ss
 l
o
n
e 
p
ar
en
ts
 a
n
d
 c
o
u
p
le
s 
d
o
 n
o
t 
liv
e 
in
p
ov
er
ty
 b
ec
au
se
 t
h
ei
r 
so
ci
al
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n
 s
ys
te
m
s
p
ro
te
ct
 t
h
em
 f
ro
m
 p
ov
er
ty
. 
Fu
rt
h
er
m
o
re
 t
h
er
e
ar
e 
ve
ry
 s
u
b
st
an
ti
al
 p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
s 
o
f 
p
o
o
r 
ch
ild
re
n
w
h
o
se
 p
ar
en
ts
 a
re
 n
o
t 
w
o
rk
le
ss
. 
A
d
el
m
an
 a
n
d
B
ra
d
sh
aw
 i
n
 t
h
ei
r 
an
al
ys
is
 o
f 
th
e 
1
9
9
5
/6
 F
am
ily
R
es
o
u
rc
es
 S
u
rv
ey
 f
o
u
n
d
 t
h
at
 1
3
 p
er
 c
en
t 
o
f 
p
o
o
r
ch
ild
re
n
 (
liv
in
g
 i
n
 f
am
ili
es
 w
it
h
 e
q
u
iv
al
en
t
in
co
m
es
 b
el
o
w
 h
al
f 
n
at
io
n
al
 a
ve
ra
g
e 
af
te
r
h
o
u
si
n
g
 c
o
st
s)
 h
ad
 o
n
e 
ea
rn
er
 a
n
d
 a
 f
ew
 e
ve
n
h
ad
 t
w
o
 e
ar
n
er
s.
 T
h
es
e 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
s 
m
ay
 n
o
w
h
av
e 
fa
lle
n
 a
s 
a 
re
su
lt
 o
f 
th
e 
in
tr
o
d
u
ct
io
n
 o
f 
th
e
m
in
im
u
m
 w
ag
e,
 W
o
rk
in
g
 F
am
ili
es
 T
ax
 C
re
d
it
,
C
h
ild
 C
ar
e 
Ta
x 
C
re
d
it
 a
n
d
 r
ea
l 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
in
 C
h
ild
B
en
ef
it
 b
u
t 
th
e 
p
o
in
t 
re
m
ai
n
s 
—
 e
m
p
lo
ym
en
t 
d
o
es
n
o
t 
g
u
ar
an
te
e 
m
ov
em
en
t 
o
u
t 
o
f 
p
ov
er
ty
 a
n
d
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
is
 n
ev
er
 g
o
in
g
 t
o
 b
e 
th
e 
o
n
ly
 w
ay
 t
o
ab
o
lis
h
 c
h
ild
 p
ov
er
ty
.
T
h
er
e 
ar
e 
al
so
 r
ea
so
n
s 
to
 q
u
es
ti
o
n
 t
h
is
 i
n
d
ic
at
o
r
in
 i
ts
 o
w
n
 r
ig
h
t.
 E
st
im
at
es
 a
re
 t
o
 b
e 
d
er
iv
ed
 f
ro
m
th
e 
La
b
o
u
r 
Fo
rc
e 
S
u
rv
ey
 a
n
d
/o
r 
th
e 
Fa
m
ily
R
es
o
u
rc
es
 S
u
rv
ey
. 
6
.
A
 r
ed
u
ct
io
n
 i
n
 t
h
e 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
ch
ild
re
n
 l
iv
in
g
in
 w
o
rk
le
ss
 h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s,
 f
o
r 
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s 
o
f 
a
g
iv
en
 s
iz
e,
 o
ve
r 
th
e 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 c
yc
le
. 
S
u
g
g
es
ti
o
n
s 
C
ri
ti
ci
sm
s 
O
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y 
fo
r 
A
ll
in
d
ic
at
o
rs
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A
n
 a
d
d
it
io
n
al
 a
n
d
 p
er
h
ap
s 
b
et
te
r 
in
d
ic
at
o
r 
th
at
co
u
ld
 b
e 
u
se
d
 i
s 
th
e 
in
ci
d
en
ce
 o
f 
h
o
m
el
es
sn
es
s
am
o
n
g
 c
h
ild
re
n
 a
n
d
 y
o
u
n
g
 p
eo
p
le
 a
n
d
/o
r 
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s 
w
it
h
 c
h
ild
re
n
 i
n
 t
em
p
o
ra
ry
ac
co
m
m
o
d
at
io
n
. 
T
h
is
 w
as
 i
n
cl
u
d
ed
 a
s 
o
n
e 
o
f 
th
e
ÔM
ile
st
o
n
es
Õ 
in
 t
h
e 
S
co
tt
is
h
 v
er
si
o
n
 o
f 
O
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y
fo
r 
A
ll.
(h
tt
p
:/
w
w
w
.s
co
tl
an
d
.g
ov
.u
k/
lib
ra
ry
2
/d
o
c0
7
/s
jt
d
-
0
2
.h
tm
).
 
T
h
is
 i
s 
(a
rg
u
ab
ly
) 
an
 i
n
p
u
t 
ra
th
er
 t
h
an
 o
u
tc
o
m
e
m
ea
su
re
 b
u
t 
th
er
e 
is
 n
o
 d
o
u
b
t 
th
at
 p
o
o
r 
h
o
u
si
n
g
h
as
 a
n
 i
m
p
ac
t 
o
n
 a
ll 
so
rt
s 
o
f 
el
em
en
ts
 o
f
ch
ild
re
n
Õs
 w
el
l-
b
ei
n
g
. 
H
o
w
ev
er
 t
h
er
e 
ar
e
q
u
es
ti
o
n
s 
to
 b
e 
as
ke
d
 a
b
o
u
t 
w
h
et
h
er
 t
h
is
 (
an
d
 
9
 b
el
o
w
) 
ar
e 
th
e 
b
es
t 
in
d
ic
at
o
rs
 o
f 
p
h
ys
ic
al
 w
el
l-
b
ei
n
g
 a
va
ila
b
le
. 
E
st
im
at
es
 o
f 
th
e 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f
ch
ild
re
n
 l
iv
in
g
 i
n
 p
o
o
r 
h
o
u
si
n
g
 a
re
 a
va
ila
b
le
 f
ro
m
th
e 
E
n
g
lis
h
 H
o
u
se
 C
o
n
d
it
io
n
s 
S
u
rv
ey
 b
u
t 
th
e 
d
at
a
is
 o
n
ly
 a
va
ila
b
le
 e
ve
ry
 f
iv
e 
ye
ar
s!
 F
u
rt
h
er
m
o
re
, 
in
1
9
9
6
 o
n
ly
 1
3
 p
er
 c
en
t 
o
f 
ch
ild
re
n
 w
er
e 
liv
in
g
 i
n
h
o
u
se
s 
th
at
 w
er
e 
u
n
fi
t 
o
r 
in
 s
u
b
st
an
ti
al
 d
is
re
p
ai
r
o
r 
re
q
u
ir
in
g
 e
ss
en
ti
al
 m
o
d
er
n
is
at
io
n
, 
an
d
 t
h
at
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 h
ad
 h
ar
d
ly
 c
h
an
g
ed
 b
et
w
ee
n
 1
9
9
1
an
d
 1
9
9
6
. 
S
o
 a
s 
w
el
l 
as
 h
av
in
g
 t
o
 w
ai
t 
fi
ve
 y
ea
rs
to
 o
b
se
rv
e 
th
e 
tr
en
d
, 
th
e 
tr
en
d
 m
ay
 n
o
t 
b
e 
a
p
ar
ti
cu
la
rl
y 
se
n
si
ti
ve
 i
n
d
ic
at
io
n
 o
f 
w
el
l-
b
ei
n
g
. 
8
.
A
 r
ed
u
ct
io
n
 i
n
 t
h
e 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
ch
ild
re
n
 l
iv
in
g
in
 p
o
o
r 
h
o
u
si
n
g
.
N
o
n
e 
T
h
ey
 a
re
 a
ll 
in
p
u
t 
in
d
ic
at
o
rs
 b
u
t 
th
ey
 a
re
 o
b
vi
o
u
s
ca
n
d
id
at
es
 i
n
 a
n
y 
in
d
ex
 o
f 
p
ov
er
ty
 a
n
d
 s
o
ci
al
ex
cl
u
si
o
n
 —
 t
h
o
u
g
h
 t
h
ey
 a
re
 n
o
t 
av
ai
la
b
le
 a
t 
as
lo
ca
l 
a 
le
ve
l 
as
 b
en
ef
it
 c
la
im
in
g
 d
at
a 
is
. 
7
.
Lo
w
 i
n
co
m
e 
in
d
ic
at
o
rs
:
a.
a 
re
d
u
ct
io
n
 i
n
 t
h
e 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
ch
ild
re
n
 i
n
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s 
w
it
h
 r
el
at
iv
el
y 
lo
w
 i
n
co
m
es
;
b
.
a 
re
d
u
ct
io
n
 i
n
 t
h
e 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
ch
ild
re
n
 i
n
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s 
w
it
h
 l
o
w
 i
n
co
m
es
 i
n
 a
n
ab
so
lu
te
 s
en
se
; 
an
d
 
c.
a 
re
d
u
ct
io
n
 i
n
 t
h
e 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
ch
ild
re
n
w
it
h
 p
er
si
st
en
tl
y 
lo
w
 i
n
co
m
es
.
S
u
g
g
es
ti
o
n
s 
C
ri
ti
ci
sm
s 
O
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y 
fo
r 
A
ll 
in
d
ic
at
o
rs
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It
 m
ig
h
t 
h
av
e 
b
ee
n
 b
et
te
r 
to
 h
av
e 
ch
o
se
n
 t
h
e
ch
ild
 m
o
rt
al
it
y 
ra
te
 d
u
e 
to
 a
cc
id
en
ts
 a
s 
a 
m
o
re
p
re
ci
se
 i
n
d
ic
at
o
r 
o
f 
se
ri
o
u
s 
ac
ci
d
en
ts
, 
n
o
t 
le
as
t
b
ec
au
se
 i
t 
ap
p
ea
rs
 t
o
 b
e 
m
o
re
 c
lo
se
ly
 a
ss
o
ci
at
ed
w
it
h
 p
ov
er
ty
 t
h
an
 i
n
ju
ri
es
. 
O
r,
 t
o
 r
ef
in
e 
it
 e
ve
n
fu
rt
h
er
, 
it
 m
ig
h
t 
h
av
e 
b
ee
n
 b
et
te
r 
to
 h
av
e 
ch
o
se
n
ch
ild
 d
ea
th
s 
fr
o
m
 t
ra
ff
ic
 a
cc
id
en
ts
 o
r 
ac
ci
d
en
ts
 i
n
th
e 
h
o
m
e 
w
h
ic
h
 a
re
 t
h
e 
tw
o
 m
o
st
 c
le
ar
ly
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
it
h
 p
ov
er
ty
.
T
h
er
e 
ar
e 
a 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
o
th
er
 i
n
d
ic
at
o
rs
 r
el
at
ed
 t
o
p
h
ys
ic
al
 h
ea
lt
h
 w
h
ic
h
 m
ig
h
t 
h
av
e 
b
ee
n
co
n
si
d
er
ed
 i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
 i
n
fa
n
t 
m
o
rt
al
it
y,
 c
h
ild
d
ea
th
s,
 l
o
w
 b
ir
th
-w
ei
g
h
t 
b
ir
th
s,
 t
h
e 
p
re
va
le
n
ce
 o
f
so
m
e 
co
n
g
en
it
al
 a
n
o
m
al
ie
s,
 s
el
f 
(o
r 
p
ar
en
ta
l
re
p
o
rt
ed
) 
ch
ro
n
ic
 i
lln
es
s,
 s
o
m
e 
in
fe
ct
io
u
s
d
is
ea
se
s,
 t
h
e 
p
re
va
le
n
ce
 o
f 
d
en
ta
l 
ca
ri
es
, 
o
b
es
it
y
—
 a
ll 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
it
h
 p
ov
er
ty
 a
n
d
 a
ll 
av
ai
la
b
le
fr
o
m
 n
at
io
n
al
 s
o
u
rc
es
 o
n
 a
 r
eg
u
la
r 
b
as
is
. 
T
h
e
ab
se
n
ce
 o
f 
m
o
re
 h
ea
lt
h
 i
n
d
ic
at
o
rs
 i
n
 t
h
is
 l
is
t 
is
su
rp
ri
si
n
g
 —
 g
iv
en
 t
h
e 
A
ch
es
o
n
 R
ep
o
rt
an
d
 t
h
e
O
u
r 
H
ea
lt
h
ie
r 
N
at
io
n
ta
rg
et
s.
 T
h
e 
S
co
tt
is
h
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MEASURING WIDER ASPECTS OF POVERTY AND SOCIAL
EXCLUSION
Lisa Harker, Institute of Public Policy Research
Introduction
This paper considers whether the current approach of adopting a range of indicators
to monitor poverty and social exclusion is appropriate, suggests a rationale for
deciding which indicators should be included and observes some of the constraints
imposed on the current approach because of the limitations of existing data.
A single measure or group of measures?
There is a range of indicators of poverty and social exclusion set out in the
GovernmentÕs annual poverty report Opportunity for All. This is important for a
number of reasons.
¥ Poverty is normally defined in terms of a lack of material resources, especially
income.1 But it is often difficult to unravel the impact of poverty from that of
deprivation or social exclusion. Deprivation indicators normally encompass a wider
lack of material resources, including services and amenities. Social exclusion is
often defined as the inability to participate effectively socially, politically and
culturally.2
¥ The limitations of the income measure of poverty — its failure to accurately
measure household poverty, for example — necessitates a broad range of measures
in order to capture poverty and social exclusion effectively.
¥ A broad range of measures allows you to monitor some preventative issues 
(e.g. early development, education achievement, teenage pregnancy) which
capture the risk of poverty/social exclusion, as well as evidence of poverty or social
exclusion itself.
¥ Measurement of poverty on income alone is difficult to sustain politically — it can
be too easily dismissed where a wide range of measures cannot.
On the other hand a single indicator is appealing because of clarity. A headline or
priority indicator is needed in order to monitor progress towards meeting the pledge
to eradicate child poverty by 2020. In the absence of any other headline measure the
Households Below Average Income measure will be used by politicians, the media and
others as the principal measure of progress towards reducing poverty. 
The strongest contender for the headline indicator is an income poverty measure —
since this is likely to capture poverty and social exclusion most effectively. But
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1 Eg Oppenheim, C (1998) Poverty and social exclusion: an overview, in Oppenheim, C (ed) An Inclusive Society:
strategies for tackling poverty, IPPR.
2 Eg Room, G (1995) Beyond the threshold: the measurement and analysis of social exclusion, The Policy Press.
consideration needs to be given as to whether it is possible to find a better measure
than the HBAI one currently used and whether a measure can be found which
captures wider experience of deprivation. It is worth considering whether it might be
possible for the headline indicator to be comprised of a series of measures — in the
way the Breadline Britain measure does. It would also be advantageous to have a
headline measure that is internationally comparable.
The headline indicator would need to be supplemented by other measures in order to
capture broader aspects of deprivation and social exclusion. 
Which aspects of poverty, deprivation and social exclusion should
we monitor?
It is important to establish a clear rationale to determine which measures are
included and which are not. Accepting that it would not be possible to monitor every
aspect of poverty meaningfully, there should at least be justification for the
preference of monitoring certain aspects of poverty over others. 
In trying to prioritise indicators it might be constructive to consider a spectrum of
intensity of well-being: at one extreme you have acute income poverty and at the
other you have aspects of well-being associated with the majority of the population
(e.g. lack of clean air).
Measures of poverty and social exclusion should be somewhere between income
poverty and well-being but focused on the Ôbottom endÕ — in other words, the
measures should reflect concern about where there are unacceptable differences in
living standards and opportunities. There is a good case for well-being indicators
informing the policy process — as they are in the DETRÕs sustainable development
strategy, for example. But measures of general well-being should not be confused
with measures of poverty. 
On this categorisation there are some measures in Opportunity for All which are
currently too Ôwell-beingÕ orientated. They include: 
¥ an increase in the proportion of older people being helped to live independently;
¥ an increase in healthy life expectancy to age 65; and
¥ a reduction in the proportion of older people whose lives are affected by fear of
crime.
There are also a number of other areas where there are unacceptable differences in
living standards which are not currently reflected in the indicators:
¥ quality of employment and job insecurity; 
¥ access to services and amenities; 
¥ non-participation in civic organisations/participation in local decision making;
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¥ debt/or some measure of lack of assets/savings;
¥ home insecurity (eg temporary accommodation, mortgage arrears);
¥ physical environment (eg access to clean, safe spaces);
¥ health inequalities (including child accident mortality/injury); and
¥ area based data: gap between rural and urban areas, north and south.
Of these, some are stronger poverty/deprivation indicators than others.3 For example,
children in the lowest socio-economic group are over four times more likely to be
killed as pedestrians than their counterparts in the highest socio-economic group4 and
this inequality has increased during the past 20 years.5 To establish a group of
priority indicators from both the above list and the existing indicators in Opportunity
for All it will be important to consider:
(i) the strongest predictors of poverty/deprivation; 
(ii) a range of types of indicators to capture deprivation/social exclusion; and
(iii) the possibility of updating a list of indicators to allow inclusion of new indicators
in the future in light of emerging problems (e.g. lack of access to the internet?). 
Arguably the most important poverty measure is whether people feel less poor. The
only way of knowing this is to involve the community in monitoring progress, both by
consulting communities about which aspects of anti-poverty action they would
prioritise and then testing whether progress is made in those areas. The Government
might consider involving the public in the development of the indicators, as has been
recommended elsewhere.6
Data quality issues
One of the current constraints on measuring progress on poverty reduction is the
data itself. There are three problems associated with the data on which the indicators
are based.7
¥ Out-of-date data: 
— only three of the indicators were based on data up to 1999. Only the indicators
relating to literacy/numeracy, working age employment and working age
qualifications were based on up-to-date data;
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3 Some e.g. participation measures, currently lack sufficient data.
4 Christie, Nicola (1995) Social, economic and environmental factors in child pedestrian accidents: a research overview.
Transport Research Laboratory report no. 116
5 Roberts, I and C. Power (1996) Does the decline in child injury mortality vary by social class? A comparison of class
specific mortality in 1981 and 1991. British Medical Journal, 311, 784-86.
6 Bennett, F & Roche, C (2000) Developing indicators: the scope for participatory approaches, New Economy, March
2000, Volume 7, 1, 24-29.
7 All these points refer to the data used for the first Annual Report. Some improvements were made for the indicators
presented in the Second Annual Report — in terms of both the timeliness and availability of the data — but the key
problems outlined here still remain. 
— one in four of the indicators relied on data that was three or more years out of
date. Because of this some policies which will have had an impact on poverty —
such as the Minimum Wage and the Working Families Tax Credit — had no effect
on the indicators. Given this time lag in data collection, the impact of the
Working Families Tax Credit will not show up until 2002 and the impact of the
new stakeholder pension (due to be introduced April 2001) will not show up
until 2004.
¥ Incomplete data:
— for five of the 32 indicators there was no existing baseline data;
— well over half (19/32) of the indicators related to England only and only six of
the indicators are based on UK data. The income data is Great Britain only.
¥ The national data is not joined-up with local data:
— the national poverty indicators were not developed in line with the data collated
for the purpose of informing the distribution of regeneration funding, despite the
fact that they broadly seek to capture the same problems. Should poverty data
be brought together with regeneration data to ensure that national data is
collated and acted upon locally? Notwithstanding the difficulties associated with
collating some of the national data (such as households below average income
data) at a local level, it would make sense to bring national and local poverty
data closer together. For example, the Index of Local Deprivation has an Ôaccess
to servicesÕ measure which is currently missing from the national picture.
As the GovernmentÕs anti-poverty strategy has gained greater political priority, the
need for up-to-date and accurate data to measure progress has increased. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, the GovernmentÕs adoption of a range of poverty/social exclusion
measures is welcome but there needs to be:
¥ consideration of what should be the main headline measure;
¥ the establishment of a rationale for the inclusion (or not) of supplementary
indicators. Here it is suggested that broader measures of well-being affecting the
majority of the population should not be included but that those indicators that
demonstrate unacceptable differences should be prioritised;
¥ improvements made to the data collection and analysis process for those indicators
that are chosen.
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SUMMARY MEASURES OF CHILD WELL-BEING
Helen Barnes, Policy Studies Institute
Introduction
It can be difficult to gain an accurate impression of whether childrenÕs well-being is
improving or deteriorating, even where there are regular reports and monitoring
systems in place. For this reason, some authorities favour index-type measurements,
including composite measures for countries or states based on change in a number of
key variables. Campaigners wanting to improve the outcomes for children often argue
that a summary measure of childrenÕs well-being for the UK could help to focus
attention on how children are doing. It is argued that creating a measure which could
be regularly reported alongside widely accepted economic indicators such as the FTSE
index could encourage greater public concern about children and their well-being, and
help to generate stronger political support for policies to reduce child poverty. This
short paper discusses briefly some of the advantages and disadvantages of such an
approach, compared to other reporting systems on children, highlights the issues
which need to be considered in designing such a measure, and considers some
examples from abroad.
The policy context
While child well-being has historically been a focus for social policy interventions, and
all developed countries have a range of data which can be used to measure child
well-being (including vital statistics, administrative statistics and primary research on
children and young people), recent policy interest and developments in the
systematic monitoring of child well-being have been stimulated by two main issues.
The 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child imposed a new set of reporting
requirements on national governments, and the process of meeting these
requirements has encouraged many governments to improve their national reporting
systems (although many of the reports for the UN contain little date on child
outcomes, being primarily concerned with issues such as the legal rights of children).
There was also a continuing debate amongst academics and welfare professionals
during the 1980s and 1990s about the effects of recession and public expenditure
cuts in child well-being. This has been given a sharper edge by the UN Convention
and by increasing interest in children as independent social actors. In the UK, the
election of a Labour Government in 1997, the subsequent adoption of a pledge to end
child poverty, and the implementation of an anti-poverty strategy with its own annual
reporting framework, has heightened interest in ways of monitoring and measuring
outcomes for children.
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Session 3: Overall approaches to monitoring
success
Advantages of summary measures
As noted above, an index showing how well children are doing may be more effective
than a long and complex report in gaining the attention of the media and the public.
Summary measures of child well-being can facilitate comparisons between different
countries and different areas within countries, and draw attention to the outcomes of
poverty and inequality. The UN Human Development Index (covering literacy, life
expectancy and educational enrolment) is one example of an established and highly
effective measure, which demonstrates the outcomes of economic and social
deprivation, and highlights the gulf between outcomes for children in richer and
poorer nations, but is less effective in differentiating between countries in the
developed world (http://www.undp.org/hdro/indicators/html). Many of the issues
facing children in developing countries are different from those in industrialised
countries. The increasing prosperity of developed countries has been argued to result
in a declining significance for traditional indicators such as mortality rates (although
the large differentials in mortality rates for deprived and wealthier areas suggest that
these still have explanatory power), while the so-called Ônew morbidityÕ has led to a
need to measure other negative outcomes, such as teen suicides, drug use, road
traffic accidents and so on (De Winter, 1997, Bradshaw, 2001). More positively, a
growing awareness of children as independent social actors, and a concern that
wealthier nations should be concerned with quality of life issues for children, rather
than mere survival, has led to interest in measuring beneficial aspects of childrenÕs
development and experience (Ben-Arieh and Wintersberger; Moore, 1997). Summary
measures can also be used as diagnostic tools, where research has indicated
threshold levels of risk or risk avoidance, whether to guide professional practice in
individual cases, or as a tool for policy makers intending to target measures on
certain areas. The Ôhealthy birth indexÕ and Ôbirth risk indexÕ discussed below are
examples of this type of measure.
Disadvantages of summary measures
An index which covers only a small number of items is easier to interpret and more
readily accessible to the general public than a detailed report, but may present a
partial and misleading picture of childrenÕs well-being. A more complex index,
covering both different domains (such as health, educational outcomes) and different
age groups (according to established developmental stages) may provide a more
subtle measure of outcomes, but can be difficult to interpret and may be less readily
understood by the general public. It will also reduce the extent to which it is possible
to make comparisons with other countries or areas, since even where data on the
same issues is held, there are likely to be differences in definitions which limit
comparability (Micklewright and Stewart, 1999). It can also be difficult to know how
to weight the items in a composite index, for instance where there is a fall in child
mortality rates, but a rise in childhood disability. It is also necessary to take account
of the population base of areas being compared, especially where there are known
associations between demographic factors (such as age and partnership status) and
certain outcomes. Few existing measures actually take account of these issues.
Although there is a large literature on the construction of summary measures, all too
often indices are constructed in an ad hoc way, according to the types of information
which are readily available, or the policy interests of the actors involved in
establishing them (Phillips and Love, 1997). It should also be said that although
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certain outcomes have established associations with poverty, the causal mechanisms
are by no means well understood, so that generating improvements in outcomes may
be a complex and time-consuming process. For instance, in the US, policies aimed at
increasing take-up of antenatal care amongst poor mothers have been seen as a
simplistic and ineffective response to evidence of the links between poor birth
outcomes and poor use of antenatal care, since both were in fact symptomatic of
underlying problems which required more fundamental change (Hauser et al., 1997).
The apparent intractability of certain problems may also create political disincentives
to the adoption of monitoring instruments, since no Government wishes to draw
attention to failure.
Approaches adopted elsewhere
The UNICEF Index of Social Health (Table 3.1) is a simple measure intended to
maximise comparability across countries. It compares countries on the basis of two
outcomes (rates of infant mortality and teen suicide) and two measures of policy
input (public expenditure on education and income distribution). Because countries
vary so much in their demographic and economic circumstances, this measure is used
not to compare countries with each other, but to measure countries against their own
past performance. By contrast, the ÔKids CountÕ index, developed by the Annie E.
Casey Foundation (Table 3.1) has been developed specifically to enable rankings to be
made between states in the US. It consists of ten items, seven of which are outcome
measures, and three of which relate to household circumstances. In reaching a
composite ranking, each item on the index is treated as having equal weight. Annual
rankings are published both for the individual indictors and based on the composite
index (http://www.aecf.org/kidscount/kc1999). These are presented together with a
more detailed report on each state, which provides a social and economic context
against which its performance can be evaluated. 
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In New Zealand a range of measures has been benchmarked as part of a strategy to
improve outcomes for families experiencing multiple and persistent disadvantage (see
Table 3.2). These 22 measures include policy inputs, outcomes, and risk factors, and
in common with many similar reporting frameworks are concerned mainly with
negative indicators. There is also a concentration of measures relating to young
children and to teenagers, but very little data for children aged 7 to 14. The 22
indicators are not presented as a summary measure, but targets have been set to
reduce them over a 5- and 10-year period, with a concentration on six indicators
which are seen as a priority; under-five mortality, abuse and neglect renotifications
(age 0-6), the proportion of 3-years-olds in education, abuse and neglect
renotifications (age 7-16), teenage fertility (live birth to girls aged 13-17) and the
proportion leaving school with a formal qualification. Two measures relating to
involvement with the police, for teenagers, were added in 1998, in response to a
perceived need for data. 
Table 3.1: Two simple summary measures
UNICEF Index of Social Health 
¥ Infant mortality.
¥ Public expenditure on education.
¥ Teen suicides. 
¥ Income distribution.
ÔKids CountÕ Ranking Index
¥ Low birth weight (under 5.5 lbs).
¥ Infant mortality.
¥ Child mortality. 
¥ Teen mortality from accidents/homicide/suicide.
¥ Teen births. 
¥ Teen high school drop-out.
¥ Teens not in school or employment.
¥ Parents not in full-time, year-round work.
¥ Living in poor household.
¥ Living in household headed by lone parent.
Source: Kids Count Data Book, Annie E. Casey Foundation 
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Table 3.2: New Zealand ÔStrengthening FamiliesÕ Target Measures
Indicator Baseline 2000 target 2010 
(** priority indicator) (1995 or target target
nearest date)
Road traffic deaths 31 25 not
per 100,000 (age 15—19) established
Youth suicides per 100,000 38.9 (M) 33 (M) 29 (M)
(age 15—19) 6.3 (F) 5.4 (F) 4.7 (F)
Hospital injury discharge rate 2,517 2,100 1,770
per 100,000 (age 15—19) 
Abuse/neglect renotifications 11.68 75% 50% 
per 1,000 (age 7—16)** baseline baseline
Live births per 100,000 1121 1090 975
females (age 13—17)** 
Percentage smoking tobacco 34.2 22 19
(age 18—24) 
Drug/alcohol risk behaviour not not not
established established established 
Serious/repeat offending 13.76 80% 65% 
per 1,000 (age 10—16) baseline baseline
Offenders under 16 dealt 44,654 not not
with by police established established
Prosecutions of people 4,798 not not
under 16 established established
Percentage leaving school 81.9 84 90
with formal qualification** 
Infant mortality (per 1,000 6.7 5 4
live births) 
Under-five mortality 8.3 7 5
(per 1,000 live births)** 
Hospital injury discharge 2,401 2,040 1,680 
rate per 100,000 (age 0—4)
Abuse death rate per 1.23 1.0 0.8 
100,000 (age 0—14) 
Abuse/neglect renotifications 9.08 80% 50%
per 1,000 (age 0—6)** baseline baseline 
Out-of-family placements 375,000 95% 75%
(age 0—16), number of baseline baseline
bednights 
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(Source: New Zealand Department of Social Welfare, 1998)
Looking at the range of indicators highlights some issues which are common to most
attempts to create a comprehensive measure of child well-being. For one thing it is
not fully comprehensive, either in its age range (as noted above) or in terms of the
topics covered (insufficient data is available on issues such as ethnicity and eating
disorders, which primary research or local data have shown to be important). Some
indicators (such as prosecution rates, abuse/neglect renotifications and out of family
placements) are highly susceptible to policy changes, and could demonstrate large
differences without these necessarily being related to any actual change in outcomes
for children. At the same time, the most objective and valid indicators (such as death
from child abuse) are difficult to use because their low rates of incidence make it
difficult to track change, especially at regional or local level.
In the USA, there are annual reports on children at a national level. These are
presented in two formats; a simple version with 25-30 indicators and a more detailed
version with over 80 indicators aimed at child welfare professionals (Table 3.3 shows
the latest indicators for the ÔshortÕ version). In contrast to the New Zealand
document, there is no attempt to benchmark outcomes or to aim for a particular rate
on any one indicator, as the reports are not linked into a specific strategy. However,
they do present a wide range of very detailed information and in a clearly
understandable fashion. For instance, the indicators concerned with economic security
(and thus ÔinputÕ rather than ÔoutcomeÕ measures) are grouped together, as are
health, and education outcomes, making the results clear and easily accessible to the
public and related to specific areas of policy concern. There are detailed breakdowns
by age, by race and by gender, so that there is some context in which to interpret the
results. However, only one indicator is presented specifically in terms of its relation to
poverty status. Problems linking readily available administrative data and vital
statistics with poverty data obtained from surveys, and often after a considerable
Table 3.2 cont.: New Zealand ÔStrengthening FamiliesÕ Target Measures
Indicator Baseline 2000 2010
(** priority indicator) (1995 or target target
nearest date)
Percentage of pregnant 33 20 18
women smoking 
Birth weight under 2,500 59 57 55
grammes (per 1,000
live births) 
Percentage of children 8.3 5 4
entering school with
hearing loss 
Percentage of children 56 95 95
aged two with completed
immunizations 
Percentage of children 79.9 84 90
age three in early
education** 
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time-lag, means that few countries are in a position to report outcome measures in
relation to poverty rates. Presenting child poverty rates is even more problematic,
since the structure of some surveys makes it impossible to use the child as the unit
of analysis.
The final example to be presented here is an example of a measure which can be
used in a variety of ways; as a reporting measure, as a diagnostic tool, and as an
aide to targeting policy. It consists of a healthy birth index, a birth risk index, and a
measure which combines the two, developed by the Annie E. Casey Foundation in the
USA (Table 3.4). One advantage of this type of measure is that it is based on
established risk factors, which have credibility with professionals, and are specific to
one area of policy and practice. The index can be simply presented to the public as a
Table 3.3: AmericaÕs Children Indicators — ÔshortÕ version
Economic security
¥ Percentage of children (under 18) in poverty.
¥ Percentage of children experiencing food poverty.
¥ Housing problems in families with children.
¥ Percentage of children with one parent in year-round, full-time work.
¥ Percentage of children covered by health insurance.
Health
¥ Percentage of children in good or excellent health.
¥ Mother receiving early prenatal care, by race.
¥ Infant mortality, by race.
¥ Low birth-weight, by race.
¥ Completed immunisation 19-35 months, by poverty status.
¥ Percentage of children aged 5-17 who are disabled.
¥ Mortality rate age 1-4 and 5-14, by race.
¥ Mortality rate age 15-19, by race and gender.
¥ Motor vehicle and firearm injury death rates age 15-19, by race and gender.
¥ Birth rate, females 15-17 years.
Behaviour and social environment
¥ Percentage of students reporting daily smoking in last 30 days.
¥ Percentage of students drinking alcohol twice or more in last 30 days, by grade.
¥ Percentage of students reporting use of illicit drugs in last 30 days.
¥ Teenage victims of violent crime, by gender.
Education
¥ Percentage of those aged 5-17 who donÕt speak English at home, and have
problems speaking English.
¥ Percentage of those aged 3-5 read to every day, by motherÕs education.
¥ Percentage of those aged 3-4 in nursery or centre-based day care.
¥ Maths proficiency scores, age 9, 13 and 17 years.
¥ Reading proficiency scores, age 9,13 and 17 years.
¥ Percentage of those aged 18-24 who have completed high school.
¥ Percentage of those aged 16-19 neither in education or employment.
¥ Percentage of those aged 25-29 with BachelorÕs degree or higher, by race. 
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unitary measure, but is readily understood and interpreted because of the familiarity
of the items included and their limited number. In addition, although there is no
sophisticated weighting, the range of items selected provides a balance between the
different factors involved. Thus a birth to a single mother under 20 who has fewer
than 12 years of education is seen as likely to create some risk factors for the child,
while a birth to an older unmarried mother, with at least 12 years of education, is
viewed as only marginally likely to give rise to risk.
It will be clear even from looking at the limited number of examples above, that
there has been a great deal of work on indicators of child well-being over the past
five to ten years, and while there is no single example of best practice, there are
many examples of good practice which can guide future work in this area. Table 3.5
presents a summary of the ideal criteria for designing indicators, highlighting the
importance of both comparability over time and sensitivity to developing trends, and
noting the need for a level of sophistication able to take account of differences in age
and culture, and differentiate between the depth, breadth and duration of spells in
poverty and other adverse life situations.
Table 3.4: Key indicators for health in birth
Healthy birth index
¥ Weight of at least 5.5 lbs.
¥ 5-minute Agpar score of 9 or 10.
¥ Gestation of 37 weeks or more.
¥ Prenatal care started in first trimester.
Birth risk index
¥ Mother under 20 years of age.
¥ Mother unmarried.
¥ Mother has fewer than 12 years of education.
Risk indicators for health at birth
¥ Mother under 20 years of age.
¥ Second or subsequent birth to teen mother.
¥ Mother unmarried.
¥ Mother has fewer than 12 years of education.
¥ Little or no prenatal care.
¥ Mother smoked during pregnancy.
¥ Weight under 5.5 lbs.
¥ Gestation under 37 weeks.
Source: Davis et al., 1999, The Right Start
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Conclusion
Although there are some obvious advantages to the adoption of summary reporting
measures on children and their well-being, it is clear that they also have a number of
limitations which mean that they are not a substitute for other methods of reporting
on child well-being, such as annual reports. There are strong arguments for limiting
the contents of any summary index to objective indicators if it is to provide a valid
measure of real changes in outcomes. Summary measures which are adopted need 
to be sufficiently complex to take account of the needs of children at different
developmental stages, and sufficiently clear to be of obvious relevance to the public
and to policymakers. Rather than aim for the Ôholy grailÕ of a single measure of how
children are doing, it may be better to concentrate on developing sensitive and valid
indicators for specific policy areas and particular developmental stages.
Table 3.5: Criteria for Indicators of Child Well-Being (Moore, 1997)
¥ Comprehensive coverage.
¥ Measure depth, breadth and duration.
¥ Age-specific, including transition to adulthood.
¥ Clear and comprehensible.
¥ Positive outcomes.
¥ Cross-culturally valid.
¥ Consistent over time.
¥ Anticipate future trends.
¥ Methodologically rigorous.
¥ Geographically detailed.
¥ Cost-efficient.
¥ Reflective of social goals.
¥ Adjusted for demographic trends. 
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SHOULD THE UK GOVERNMENT MEASURE POVERTY AND
SOCIAL EXCLUSION WITH A COMPOSITE INDEX?
John Micklewright, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, Florence
Introduction
I donÕt think anyone would seriously suggest that progress in realising the UK
GovernmentÕs commitment to reduce poverty and social exclusion should be
measured only by a composite index — a single number summarising all aspects of
these two problems. At best, an index could complement the presentation of a range
of separate indicators and my comments on the subject of indices should be
interpreted in this light.
What do I understand by a Ôcomposite indexÕ? I take this as the combination of a
variety of aggregate level indicators of different dimensions of well-being typically
(but not necessarily) based on different data sources. For example, an index could be
constructed to summarise an aggregate level of income (e.g. average income or the
percentage of persons classified as poor), a measure of health (e.g. life expectancy)
and a measure of educational attainment (e.g. the proportion of the population
having reached some minimum level of qualifications). Note that this conception of a
composite index differs from one where the combination is at the level of the
individual, as with a principal target indicator in the Irish GovernmentÕs National Anti-
Poverty Strategy (NAPS). (See the contribution to the seminar report by Brian Nolan,
and Nolan 1999.) An individual under the NAPS target is counted as free of poverty if
income is above a certain level and the individual is not ÔdeprivedÕ according to non-
income indicators. In this case an index of sorts is in effect constructed for an
individual with data on different dimensions of well-being that must come from the
same source.
I look in turn at the case for and against the use of a composite index before
concluding on the need for some form of summary presentation of the data in the
GovernmentÕs annual report on poverty and social exclusion, whether in index form
or not.
Advantages of an Index
There are at least two obvious arguments for the use of an index to measure
progress in reducing poverty and social exclusion.
First, like any index, an index of poverty and social exclusion would summarise,
avoiding the problem of ÔfuzzinessÕ of multiple indicators (see the contribution of John
Hills). With the publication of the Second Annual Poverty Report (DSS 2000), the
Government is now monitoring as many as 40 different indicators and has signalled
its attention to add several more to the list. A total of 34 are listed by number in the
report but the low-income indicators for different age groups are each composed of
three sub-indicators: (a) low household income in the relative sense, (b) low income
in an absolute sense and (c) persistently low income. And none of these sub-
indicators are uniquely defined: results in the report are presented with various
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thresholds for both relative and absolute poverty and with resources defined both
before and after housing costs — so that there are in effect a total of 26 low income
measures for each age-group. Such a large number of indicators reflects an
admirable concern for many different aspects of societal well-being and, in the case
of the low income indicators, for the sensitivity of results with respect to definition,
but it does not allow for a clear picture to emerge.
How can one use these indicators to come to some overall judgement of whether
Ôthings have got betterÕ or worse from one year to the next? The Government itself
does not provide any clear summary of what the indicators as a whole tell. (The
summary of progress at the start of the first chapter of the second report draws
selectively on the listed indicators and blends into its presentation figures on
government spending, information on policy, and changes in other indicators not in
the list of 34, e.g. the number of children in families claiming out of work benefits.)
Lacking this, the temptation for the reader may be to simply count the number
showing progress and the number showing regress — which is of course just an
example of a very crude index. In other words, if the Government itself does not
summarise the indicators systematically then users may do so anyway, and in a way
that might or might not make sense.
This brings me to the second advantage of presenting an index — that of
communication. ÔOne numberÕ inevitably gets a lot of attention. Were the Government
to produce an annual index of poverty and social exclusion it is unquestionable that it
would generate a great deal of public interest. For a Government that is so committed
to getting its messages across, an index provides one obvious possibility for increasing
public awareness of the problems faced by less-advantaged members of society. In the
absence of a summary quantitative measure of progress, as provided by an index, the
danger is that none of the 40+ current indicators gets sufficient attention (they are all
Ôlost in the fuzzÕ) or that excessive attention is focused on those covering just one
dimension of well-being, e.g. the income indicators.
In considering these twin attractions of indices, it is useful to bear in mind the most
obvious example of where an index of well-being has been used to great effect, the
United Nations Development ProgrammeÕs ÔHuman Development IndexÕ (HDI). The
HDI is a simple average of separate indices for GDP per capita (in PPP US$), life
expectancy and educational attainment. Published each year in the UNDPÕs Human
Development Report, the HDI and its various derivatives (the Gender Development
Index, the Gender Empowerment Measure and the Human Poverty Indices) certainly
both ÔsummariseÕ and ÔcommunicateÕ. The HDI has many critics, with criticisms based
in part on the disadvantages of indices described below, but it would be hard to deny
that it has both played an important role in summarising the state of human
development across the worldÕs nations and been a very effective communication
device, achieving a great deal of public attention for development issues. For many
people not working in the field of development, the HDI and the rest of the Human
Development Report may be their only knowledge of the UNDPÕs work.
It is important to note that the HDI has always been seen by its proponents as only
the starting point for debate on the progress of human development — as a device to
catch the eye and force attention on what lies behind the rankings, i.e. on the
separate indicators that go into its construction. Amartya Sen recounts how he was
originally a sceptic when confronted with the enthusiasm of the creator of the Human
Development Report, the late Mahbub ul Haq, for the use of a composite index. But
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he was converted when he saw the power of the HDI to channel public interest into
the different dimensions of well-being covered by the report and away from the default
of falling back on GNP as a summary measure of development (UNDP 1999, p23).
The HDI is arguably most effective when used to summarise differences among
countries rather than differences across time. (Continual revisions to the data and the
methodology and emergence of new countries — as in the splitting apart of the former
USSR — means that the changes over time in a countryÕs HDI value and rank may not
always be informative.) The analogy with an indexÕs use in the UK might be to
summarise differences in living standards among regions, something that may be of
increasing interest with the current process of devolution and of course the ever-
present debate on North-South differences within the country. (This would not be
without its problems. As the Office for National Statistics comments: ÔIt is often
quoted that the United Kingdom is subject to more boundary change than the rest of
Europe put together — and this degree of change causes real problems in producing
comparable statistics over timeÕ (ONS 2001), although this is presumably a much
bigger problem with smaller geographical units than the region).
But there is also an obvious use for geographic comparison at the national level as
well. One result of the March 2000 European Council meeting in Lisbon should be that
more attention is forced onto EU-wide comparisons of living standards, as part of the
European UnionÕs commitment to combat poverty and social exclusion among its
members. Indices may be one tool to use in making these comparisons, and not one
that should be necessarily left to EU institutions alone, such as Eurostat. The UK
might not emerge very well from such a comparison at present. Taking the UNDP
Human Poverty Index 2 (HPI-2), the index from the UNDP stable that is intended to
measure disadvantage in rich industrialised countries (as opposed to average living
standards in all countries), the UK came 11th out of 12 EU countries for which
calculations were made in the 2000 Human Development Report (in front only of
Ireland) and 16th out of 18 OECD countries (UNDP 2000, p172). (For a comparison of
child well-being in the UK with that in other EU members see Micklewright and
Stewart 2000, although separate indicators are not aggregated into an index.)
HPI-2 is a function of the percentage of the population who die before the age of 60,
the percentage who are ÔfunctionallyÕ illiterate as defined by the OECD, the
percentage living in households with income below 50% of the median, and the
percentage long-term unemployed in the labour force. Although they may do so only
crudely, these four indicators are explicitly intended to capture multiple dimensions of
poverty (the first three) together with social exclusion (the fourth) (UNDP 1998, p27),
the same purpose as the indicators in the UK GovernmentÕs annual report.
Disadvantages of an Index
The objections to the idea of calculating a composite index of poverty and social
exclusion are put simply: such an index would (a) summarise too much and in doing
so (b) communicate less than the separate indicators of each dimension of well-
being, with (c) results being sensitive to the arbitrary choices that have to be made
on the method of the indexÕs construction — including the elements to be included.
The risks of summarising too much and communicating little are obvious ones. There
are at least two aspects of this. First, the merging of data on separate dimensions of
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well-being. Imagine that there is little change in the value of an index from one year
to the next. This might be despite a worsening in one dimension of well-being, e.g.
cash poverty, and an improvement in another, e.g. life expectancy. Both the change
in poverty and the change in life expectancy need attention to be called to them but
the risk is that this would not happen with their submergence in an index. Similarly, if
a sub-national index for the UK regions were calculated, as suggested above, two
regions may appear to have similar levels of overall poverty and social exclusion, as
summarised by an index, but have very different levels of the component indicators —
a situation of considerable interest that would be hidden in the first instance by a
focus on the indexÕs values.
Second, if one index were to be calculated for the whole population (national or
regional) then by definition it would have to be based on indicators that apply to
everyone, e.g. the overall poverty rate, the overall homelessness rate, the overall
unemployment rate, etc. This would run counter to one aspect of the indicators in the
GovernmentÕs new annual report on poverty and social exclusion, namely the
presentation of separate indicators for children and young people, people of working
age, and the elderly. 
Of course, some of the reportÕs indicators for each of these three groups do in fact
measure the same thing. The low income indicators are an example. They are the
same for each group in the sense that simply give the group value of the measure in
question (e.g. the percentages in each group with relatively low income where the
latter is defined in the same way in each case). In this case an overall index for the
whole population could be calculated along with comparable sub-group indices,
something that would be likely to be an interesting exercise.
But the great majority of the poverty reportÕs indicators are in fact specific to the
three population sub-groups in question. There can be no indicator for people of
working age and the elderly that is analogous to the Second Annual ReportÕs Indicator
7, Ôa reduction in truancies and exclusions from schoolÕ. Indicator 20, Ôa reduction in
the number of people sleeping roughÕ is present only for people of working age;
Indicator 31, Ôan increase in the proportion of older people being helped to live
independentlyÕ has no analogy in the indicators for the two younger age groups.
Implicitly, this reflects the belief that the well-being of different groups should be
measured in different ways — that Ôwhat mattersÕ varies over the life-cycle — and of
course up to a point this is indisputable. In this case, an index can only be calculated
separately for each sub-group and no comparisons can be made between the groups.
There would be Ôthree numbersÕ (three incomparable numbers) and not one, with
associated problems of communicating the situation to the public.
The third objection listed above, sensitivity to arbitrary choices made on the indexÕs
construction, is one where there would inevitably be a great deal of criticism levelled.
In constructing any index a decision has to be made on which elements to include
and which to exclude and how to weight the different elements that are chosen for
inclusion. Should the index be based on 5, 10 or 50 indicators? If 5 then some very
hard choices would have to be made and the index that results will be a pretty crude
indicator. In this case the default of equal weighting would probably be hard to resist,
on the assumption that the 5 indicators were chosen to represent what might be
thought of as 5 equally important dimensions of well-being. (Agreement on that
assumption would certainly not be unanimous, even among researchers and
statisticians let alone the general public to whom the indexÕs results would be
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communicated prominently by the mass media.) If 50, then choice over indicators to
be included would not be so difficult perhaps (perhaps!) but issues of weighting
within the index would certainly come to the fore.
A further aspect of methodology where choice has to be made is on the degree of
substitutability to allow between the elements that are selected for inclusion (an issue
that is distinct from that of weighting). Does one allow, for example, a percentage
point reduction in long-term unemployment to trade-off a percentage point increase
in poverty? The UNDPÕs HPI-2 allows only partial substitution in this case. (By
contrast the Economist magazineÕs ÔMisery IndexÕ of unemployment and inflation
allows full substitution between its two elements.)
Conclusions
If a conclusion is desired in the GovernmentÕs annual report of whether, on balance,
poverty and social exclusion have fallen over the year (and how the picture varies
across different age groups or parts of the country) some summary of the large
number of indicators presented certainly seems necessary. An index is not the only
way of going about this, although in one sense it would give the clearest answer in
that the conclusion would be based on a single number. An alternative is to provide a
core of just a handful of key indicators (see the contribution to the seminar report by
John Hills). The Government could say that on balance it considers these indicators
the most important and a concise summary could be given of their movement over
the year. Even if an index were used, the reportÕs authors would clearly want to show
how the conclusion based on the index arose, i.e. to summarise the movements in
each of the indexÕs elements.
Even if no overall conclusion is desired (for whatever reason, including the belief that
it is too difficult to make such a judgement) the communication of the reportÕs
indicators could be improved. The definition of indicators should be unambiguous 
(the case of the low income indicators is critical here, notwithstanding the desire to
test for robustness to a change in definition) and the underlying data need always to
be given clearly. (A number of indicators in the second annual report are reported in
the form of unlabelled graphs with some key values mentioned only in the text.) 
An admirable example of clarity in both respects is the new annual US Government
publication, AmericaÕs Children: Key National Indicators of Well-Being (Federal
Interagency Forum on Child and Family Statistics 2000).
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OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL: MONITORING THE GOVERNMENT’S
STRATEGY TO TACKLE POVERTY AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION
Rebecca Endean, Poverty and Social Exclusion Team, Department of Social Security
Introduction
This note covers the approach taken to monitor the progress of the GovernmentÕs
strategy to tackle poverty and social exclusion in the first two annual reports of
Opportunity for All (Tackling Poverty and Social Exclusion, September 1999, 
Cm 4445 and One year on: making a difference, September 2000, Cm 4865).
Opportunity for All Indicators
The GovernmentÕs view is that poverty and social exclusion are complex and multi-
dimensional concepts. Poverty exists when people are trapped on low incomes for
long periods of time, when they lack access to good quality health, education and
housing and by the quality of their local environment. An important element is the
lack of access to opportunities to work, to learn to live healthy, active and fulfilling
lives especially in retirement. Social exclusion is a short hand label for what can
happen when individuals or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems that
can lead to a spiral of disadvantage.
The GovernmentÕs approach to tackling poverty and social exclusion is to:
¥ tackle the causes of poverty and social exclusion, not just the symptoms;
¥ create a fairer society, in which everyone has opportunities to maximise their
potential; and
¥ invest in individuals and communities to equip them to take control of their lives.
The Government has specific objectives in relation to child poverty: to end it within
twenty years and to halve it in 10. Opportunity for All monitors progress against
this strategy.
Monitoring progress involves looking across a range of different indicators. The
indicators fall into two categories:
¥ those that focus on current aspects of poverty and social exclusion. These include
indicators for education, health, housing, the quality of local environments and low
income. The low income indicators use a range of thresholds based on absolute
low income lines (those that remain constant in real terms) and relative income
lines (those that move upwards as average income increases). Persistent low
incomes are also monitored; and
¥ those that capture factors that increase the risk of experiencing deprivation later in
life. Examples in childhood are truancy and exclusion from school, teenage
pregnancy and educational attainment. Examples during working age are
employment and contributions to non-state pensions. 
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A full list of indicators is given in the annex. Precise definitions of the indicators can
be found in the technical annex to the Opportunity for All reports. The indicators are
grouped in relation to stages in the life cycle: children and young people; working
age people and older people. There is also a set of community based indicators aimed
at capturing the GovernmentÕs progress in improving the poorest communities.
Specific criteria for selecting the indicators
When choosing the indicators the following broad criteria were chosen. The
indicators:
¥ had to be relevant to the GovernmentÕs overall strategy for tackling poverty and
social exclusion. Therefore they either had to capture key current aspects of
poverty and social exclusion or factors that increase the risk of experiencing
deprivation in later life;
¥ had to be related to ÔoutcomesÕ the Government wanted to achieve rather than
ÔprocessesÕ. Therefore the number of children in workless households was selected
as an indicator rather than the number of parents who find work through the New
Deal;
¥ needed to be based on data that are publicly available and statistically robust.
Where possible this involved using series that are published under National
Statistic guidelines, for example, all of the HBAI based statistics; and
¥ needed to be unambiguous in interpretation. It should not be possible for the
indicator to improve without this either reflecting a reduction in poverty and social
exclusion or a reduction in an important causal factor.
The overall number of indicators
The approach taken in Opportunity for All has resulted in over thirty indicators. For
children and young people there are thirteen different indicators covering, for
instance, health outcomes, literacy and numeracy, low income, poor housing, and
teenage pregnancy. This has some clear advantages in that it reflects both the multi-
dimensional nature of the problem and the breadth of the GovernmentÕs strategy in
tackling it. By monitoring progress against a range of outcome indicators it will also
identify whether progress is achieved across a whole range of areas where policies
can prove effective. 
However, the large number of indicators can lead to a lack of clarity. By looking at a
large number of indicators it can be difficult to summarise these in a way that
provides an unambiguous answer to questions such as Ôhas child poverty has been
halved?Õ Clearly there are some other approaches that can be taken that provide
more clarity. One such approach is to highlight a small number of key indicators and
specify exactly Ôwhat should be counted as successÕ another approach is to construct
a composite index from a number of the over all indicators. The pros and cons of
these and other approaches are highlighted in other notes in this publication (see
John MicklewrightÕs paper for further discussion about a composite index). The second
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annual report highlights five headline indicators in key areas to monitor progress
towards eradicating child poverty. Three indicators have been set to monitor low
income, worklessness and housing. Two more are being developed covering health
inequalities and educational attainment.
Setting Targets 
The approach taken in Opportunity in All Indicators was to specify a range of
indicators across all of the different client groups. However, setting targets is also
important, especially in the short term, in order to ensure that the Government
remains on track to achieve its longer-term objectives. Therefore the Government has
set a range of specific targets which outline what it expects to achieve and by when.
Some of these relate to specific strategies — for example, the GovernmentÕs strategy
on teenage pregnancy contains a target to halve the rate of conception among those
under the age of 18 by 2010 — but most of these targets form part of a Public Service
Agreement (2000 Spending Review: Public Service Agreements, Cm 4808).
The ÔSpending Review 2000Õ announced a range of departmental and cross-
departmental Public Service Agreement targets that are relevant to the GovernmentÕs
strategy to tackle poverty and social exclusion. Examples that relate to child poverty
include:
¥ to reduce the number of children living in households with income less than 60 per
cent of the median by at least a quarter by 2004;
¥ to reduce the number of households living in social housing that falls below the set
standard of decency by a third between 2001 and 2004; and
¥ targets for improved outcomes in deprived areas.
ANNEX: LIST OF OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL INDICATORS 2000
Please note that this is a list of the indicators in the second report. Since the first
report there have been some minor changes to definitions of existing indicators, and
the addition of some new indicators. Full details of changes to the set of indicators
can be found on pages 191 to 197 of the second annual report.
Children and Young People
Improving family incomes by tackling worklessness and increasing financial
support for families
1. A reduction in the proportion of children living in workless households, for
households of a given size, over the economic cycle.
2. Low-income indicators:
a) a reduction in the proportion of children living in households with relatively low
incomes;
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b) a reduction in the proportion of children living in households with low incomes
in an absolute sense; and
c) a reduction in the proportion of children living in households with persistently
low incomes.
Investing in the crucial early years and education to break the cycle of
deprivation
3. An increase in the proportion of 7-year-old children in Sure Start areas achieving
level 1 or above in the Key Stage 1 English and maths tests.
4. An increase in the proportion of those aged 11 achieving level 4 or above in the
key stage 2 tests for literacy and numeracy.
5. An increase in the proportion of 16-year-olds with at least one GCSE at grade 
A*-G (new indicator).
6. An increase in the proportion of 19-year-olds with at least a level 2 qualification or
equivalent.
7. A reduction in the proportion of truancies and exclusions from school.
Improving the quality of childrenÕs and young peopleÕs lives
8. A reduction in the proportion of children living in a home that falls below the set
standard of decency (new indicator). 
9. A reduction in the rate at which children are admitted to hospital as a result of
an unintentional injury resulting in a hospital stay of longer than three days.
We will develop an indicator that is linked to the commitment in the NHS Plan to
set a target to narrow the gap in infant and early childhood mortality between
socio-economic groups. Specific national targets will be developed, in
consultation with external stakeholders and experts, and published in 2001.
Supporting young people at risk
10. An increase in the proportion of 16-18-year-olds who are in learning.
11. An improvement in the educational attainment of children looked after by local
authorities.
12. A reduction in the rate of conceptions for those aged under 18 and a reduction in
the proportion of teenage parents not in education, employment or training. 
13. A reduction in the proportion of children registered during the year on the Child
Protection Register who had been previously registered (new indicator).
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People of Working Age
Building a proactive welfare system which helps people into work
14. An increase in the proportion of working age people in employment, over the
economic cycle.
15. A reduction in the proportion of working age people living in workless
households, for households of a given size, over the economic cycle.
16. A reduction in the number of working age people living in families claiming
Income Support or income-based Job SeekerÕs Allowance who have been
claiming these benefits for long periods of time.
17. An increase in the employment rates of disadvantaged groups — people with
disabilities, lone parents, ethnic minorities and the over 50s — and a reduction in
the difference between their employment rates and the overall rate.
Making work pay
18. Low-income indicators:
a) a reduction in the proportion of working age people living in households with
relatively low incomes;
b) a reduction in the proportion of working age people living in households with
low incomes in an absolute sense; and
c) a reduction in the proportion of working age people living in households with
persistently low incomes.
Encouraging life-long learning to ensure that people have the skills and
education to respond to the modern labour market
19. A reduction in the proportion of working age people without a qualification.
Providing support to vulnerable groups especially those at risk of
discrimination and disadvantage
20. A reduction in the number of people sleeping rough.
21. A reduction in the proportion of young people reporting the use of illegal drugs in
the last month and previous year, and a reduction in the proportion of young
people using the drugs which cause the greatest harm — heroin and cocaine.
22. A reduction in adult smoking rates in all social classes.
23. A reduction in the death rates from suicide and undetermined injury.
Older People
Ensuring that more of tomorrowÕs pensioners can retire on a decent income
24. An increase in the proportion of working age people contributing to a 
non-state pension.
25. An increase in the amount contributed to non-state pensions.
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26. An increase in the proportion of working age individuals who have contributed 
to a non-state pension in at least three years out of the last four.
Tackling the problems of low income and social exclusion among todayÕs
pensioners
27. Low-income indicators:
a) a reduction in the proportion of older people living in households with
relatively low incomes;
b) a reduction in the proportion of older people living in households with low
incomes in an absolute sense; and
c) a reduction in the proportion of older people living in households with
persistently low incomes.
Improving opportunities for older people to live secure, fulfilling and active
lives
28. A reduction in the proportion of older people living in a home that falls below the
set standard of decency (new indicator).
29. A reduction in the proportion of older people whose lives are affected by fear 
of crime.
30. An increase in healthy life expectancy at age 65.
31. An increase in the proportion of older people being helped to live independently.
Communities (new indicators)
Narrowing the gap between the poorest neighbourhoods and the rest of 
the country
32. A reduction in the difference between employment rates in the most deprived
local authority districts and the overall employment rate, over the economic
cycle.
33. A reduction in the national rate of domestic burglary and a reduction in the
difference between the rates in the most deprived local authority areas and the
national average.
34. A reduction in the number of families living in a home that falls below the set
standard of decency.
35. In due course, a target will be announced to reduce to zero the number of local
education authorities where fewer than a set percentage of pupils achieve level 4
in the Key Stage 2 English and maths test, thus narrowing the attainment gap.
An indicator will be agreed that is linked to this target.
36. Our objective is to narrow the health gap in childhood and throughout life
between socio-economic groups and between the most deprived areas and the
rest of the country. Specific national targets will be developed in consultation
with external stakeholders and experts in 2001. An indicator will be agreed that
is linked to the targets.
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CASE Publications
CASEpapers, a series of discussion papers produced by the ESRC Research Centre
for Analysis of Social Exclusion at the London School of Economics, are available free
of charge, as is our series of CASEbriefs, which summarise the research. Particular
conferences and activities are summarised in our occasional CASEreports series. 
These are available either from Jane Dickson, the CASE Administrator (tel: 020 7955
6679; fax: 020 7955 6951; email: j.dickson@lse.ac.uk) or can be downloaded from
our internet site: http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/Case.
CASEpapers
CASE/1 Kathleen Kiernan The Legacy of Parental Divorce: Social,
economic and demographic experiences in
adulthood
CASE/2 Tania Burchardt Boundaries between Public and Private
Welfare: A typology and map of services
(out of print)
(More detailed report, Private Welfare and Public Policy, by Tania
Burchardt, John Hills and Carol Propper, prepared for the Joseph
Rowntree Foundation, January 1999)
CASE/3 Jane Waldfogel, Maternity Leave Policies and WomenÕs 
Yoshio Higuchi and Employment after Childbirth: Evidence from
Masahiro Abe the United States, Britain and Japan
(out of print)
(Version published in Journal of Population Economics, 12, 2000)
CASE/4 A B Atkinson and Exclusion, Employment and Opportunity
John Hills (editors) (out of print)
(Version of Ch.3 by Hills, with Karen Gardiner, published as ÔPolicy
implications of new data on income mobilityÕ, Economic Journal
109(453), 1999; Ch.5 by Arulampalam and Booth published as ÔTraining
and Labour Market Flexibility: Is there a Trade-off?Õ, The British Journal
of Industrial Relations 36(4), 1998; Ch.6 by Green et al published as
ÔAre British Workers Getting More Skilled?Õ, in L. Borghans and A. de
Grip (eds), The Over-Educated Worker? The Economics of Skill
Utilisation, Edward Elgar, 2000)
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CASE/5 Julian Le Grand Tax Relief and Partnership Pensions
and Phil Agulnik
(Version published in Fiscal Studies, 19(4), 1998)
CASE/6 Simon M Burgess Early Health Related Behaviours and their
and Carol Propper Impact on Later Life Chances: Evidence from
the US
(out of print)
(Published in Health Economics 7(5), 1998)
CASE/7 Kathleen Kiernan The Divorced and Who Divorces?
and Ganka Mueller
(Chapter 16 in Changing Britain: Families and households in the 1990s,
S McRae (ed.), Oxford 1999)
CASE/8 Christian Schluter Income Dynamics in Germany, the USA and
the UK: Evidence from panel data
(out of print)
CASE/9 Simon M Burgess An Economic Model of Household Income
and Carol Propper Dynamics, with an Application to Poverty
Dynamics among American Women
CASE/10 Didier Jacobs Social Welfare Systems in East Asia: 
A Comparative Analysis Including Private
Welfare (out of print)
(Part of this paper published as ÔLow public expenditures on social
welfare: Do East Asian countries have a secret?Õ, International Journal 
of Social Welfare (January 2000)
CASE/11 Mark Kleinman Include Me Out? The new politics of place 
and poverty
(out of print)
(Published in Policy Studies, 21(1), April 2000) 
CASE/12 Brian Barry Social Exclusion, Social Isolation and the
Distribution of Income
(out of print)
CASE/13 John Hills Thatcherism, New Labour and the Welfare
State
(out of print)
(Chapter in New Labour: A turning point in British politics, H Kastendiek
and R Stimshoff (eds), Philo, 1999)
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CASE/14 Irwin Garfinkel, Fathers under Fire: The revolution in child
Sara McLanahan, support enforcement in the USA
Daniel Meyer and (out of print)
Judith Seltzer
(This CASEpaper is a summary of the book by the same title and
authors, published by the Russell Sage Foundation, 1998)
CASE/15 John Hobcraft Intergenerational and Life-Course Transmission
of Social Exclusion: Influences of Childhood
Poverty, Family Disruption, and Contact with
the Police
CASE/16 Frank A. Cowell Measuring Income Mobility with Dirty Data
and Christian Schluter
CASE/17 William Julius Wilson When Work Disappears: New Implications for
Race and Urban Poverty in the Global Economy
(Published in Ethnic and Racial Studies, 22(3), May 1999)
CASE/18 Ross Hendry Fair Shares for All? The development of needs
based government funding in education, health
and housing
(A revised part of this paper is published as Ch.3 of Paying for Health,
Education and Housing, by H Glennerster, J Hills and T Travers, with 
R Hendry, Oxford 2000)
CASE/19 Nigel Campbell The Decline of Employment Among Older
People in Britain
(out of print)
CASE/20 Jane Falkingham Welfare in Transition: Trends in poverty and
well-being in Central Asia
CASE/21 Jane Waldfogel Early Childhood Interventions and Outcomes
(out of print)
(Summarised in CASEreport 5, Persistent Poverty and Lifetime
Inequality)
CASE/22 Howard Glennerster, Poverty, Social Exclusion and Neighbourhood:
Ruth Lupton, Studying the area bases of social exclusion
Philip Noden and
Anne Power
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CASE/23 Katherine Rake, Tightropes and Tripwires: New LabourÕs 
Jane Falkingham proposals and means-testing in old age
and Martin Evans
(Version published as ÔBritish Pension Policy in the Twenty-first Century:
A partnership in pensions or a marriage to the means-test?Õ, Social
Policy and Administration, 34(3), 2000)
CASE/24 Partnership in Pensions? Responses to the Pensions Green Paper
Phil Agulnik The Proposed State Second Pension and
National Insurance
(Version published in Fiscal Studies 20(4), 1999)
Nicholas Barr A Public-Private Partnership in Pensions:
Getting the Balance Right
(Version with Phil Agulnik published in World Economics, Spring 2000)
Jane Falkingham ÔPartnership in pensionsÕ: Delivering a Secure
and Katherine Rake Retirement for Women?
Phil Agulnik Pension Tax Relief and the Green Paper
CASE/25 Gillian R Smith Area-based Initiatives: The rationale and
options for area targeting
CASE/26 Tania Burchardt The Evolution of Disability Benefits in the UK:
Re-weighting the basket
CASE/27 Huck-ju Kwon Income Transfers to the Elderly in East Asia:
Testing Asian values
CASE/28 John Hobcraft and Childhood Poverty, Early Motherhood and
Kathleen Kiernan Adult Social Exclusion
CASE/29 Jo Sparkes Schools, Education and Social Exclusion
(out of print)
CASE/30 Susan Harkness and The Family Gap in Pay: Evidence from
Jane Waldfogel Seven Industrialised Countries
CASE/31 Anne Power and Neighbourhood Management
Emmet Bergin  
CASE/32 Simon Burgess, The Class of Õ81: The effects of early-
Carol Propper, career unemployment on subsequent
Hedley Rees and unemployment experiences
Arran Shearer
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CASE/33 Didier Jacobs Low Inequality with Low Redistribution? 
An analysis of income distribution in Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan compared to Britain
CASE/34 Sheldon Danziger Investing in Children: What do we know?
and Jane Waldfogel What should we do?
(Published as the introduction to Securing the Future: Investing in
children from birth to college, S Danziger and J Waldfogel (eds), 
Russell Sage, 2000)
CASE/35 Social Exclusion and the Future of Cities
Anne Power Poor Areas and Social Exclusion
William Julius Wilson The State of American Cities
CASE/36 Tania Burchardt The Dynamics of being Disabled
CASE/37 Megan Ravenhill Homelessness and Vulnerable Young People:
A social audit of KeyChange CharityÕs
supported accommodation
CASE/38 David Piachaud How Effective is the British GovernmentÕs
and Holly Sutherland Attempt to Reduce Child Poverty?
(out of print)
(Also appeared as Innocenti Working Paper No.77, www.unicef-icdc.org)
versions published as ÔReducing child poverty in Britain: An assessment
of Government policy 1997-2001Õ, Economic Journal, forthcoming 2001;
and ÔChild poverty in Britain and the New Labour GovernmentÕ, Journal
of Social Policy, forthcoming 2001)
CASE/39 Jane Falkingham A Profile of Poverty in Tajikistan
CASE/40 Simon Burgess, Measuring Income Risk
Karen Gardiner,
Stephen P Jenkins
and Carol Propper
CASE/41 John Hills Taxation for the Enabling State
CASE/42 Howard Glennerster US Poverty Studies and Poverty Measurement:
The past twenty-five years
CASE/43 John Hobcraft The Roles of Schooling and Educational
Qualifications in the Emergence of Adult 
Social Exclusion
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CASE/44 Tom Sefton Getting Less for More: Economic Evaluation in
the Social Welfare Field
CASE/45 Bobby Duffy Satisfaction and Expectations: Attitudes to
public services in deprived areas 
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CASEbriefs
CASEbrief 1 Boundaries between public and private welfare
CASEbrief 2 Maternity leave policies and womenÕs employment after childbirth
CASEbrief 3 Exclusion, employment and opportunity
CASEbrief 4 Tax relief and partnership pensions
CASEbrief 5 The State of Welfare
CASEbrief 6 Who are the divorced and who divorces?
CASEbrief 7 Social Welfare in East Asia: Low public spending but low income
inequality?
CASEbrief 8 Childhood experiences and the risks of social exclusion in adulthood
CASEbrief 9 The Decline of Employment Among Older People in Britain
(out of print)
CASEbrief 10 The Pensions Green Paper
CASEbrief 11 Area-based Initiatives: The rationale and options for area targeting
CASEbrief 12 School, Education and Social Exclusion
CASEbrief 13 The Family Gap in Pay
CASEbrief 14 Social Security, Redistribution and Public Opinion
(out of print)
CASEbrief 15 How Effective is the British GovernmentÕs Attempt to Reduce Child
Poverty
CASEbrief 16 Measuring Income Risk
CASEbrief 17 Funding Systems for Doctors, Schools and Social Landlords
CASEbrief 18 Sprouting Seeds — Outcomes from a community-based employment
programme
CASEbrief 19 Talking to Families in East London
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CASEreports
CASEreport 1 Anthony Lee and New Cycles of Disadvantage? Report of a
John Hills conference organised by CASE on behalf of
ESRC for HM Treasury
(out of print)
CASEreport 2 John Hills (editor) CASE Annual Report 1997/98
CASEreport 3 William Julius Wilson, Welfare Reform: Learning from American
Geoff Mulgan, Mistakes? Report of a seminar organised
John Hills and by LSE Housing and CASE
David Piachaud
CASEreport 4 Liz Richardson Tackling Difficult Estates: CASE/Social
Exclusion Unit Seminar
(out of print)
CASEreport 5 Persistent Poverty and Lifetime Inequality:
The evidence.
Report of a seminar organised by HM
Treasury and CASE
(out of print)
CASEreport 6 John Hills (editor) CASE Annual Report 1998/99
CASEreport 7 Helen Evans Sprouting Seeds: Outcomes from a
community-based employment programme
CASEreport 8 Jake Elster Cycling and Social Exclusion
CASEreport 9 Katharine Mumford Talking to Families in East London: A report
on the first stage of the research
CASEreport 10 John Hills (editor) CASE Annual Report 1999/2000
CASEreport 11 Liz Richardson View of the National Strategy for
and John Hills Neighbourhood Renewal
CASEreport 12 Alex Marsh and Housing Finance Aspects of the Green Paper
John Hills (editors) 
CASEreport 13 Indicators of Progress. A discussion of
approaches to monitor the GovernmentÕs
strategy to tackle poverty and social
exclusion. Report of a workshop organised
by Department of Social Security and CASE. 
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